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ABSTRACT 
Iranian women have taken up memoir writing in response to the tumultuous recent 
history of their country and their own difficult experiences. My thesis explores twelve memoirs 
of women’s lives in Iran and abroad from the time of the Shah through the Islamic Revolution to 
the last couple of decades of reform and reaction under the Islamic Republic.  The similarities 
and variations in the experiences of the women in these cohorts reveal the value of memoirs as 
historical evidence.  These memoirs illuminate how changes in history have shaped changes in 
their authors’ consciousness, sense of self, identity, and sense of belonging as an individual 
person, as a woman, and as an Iranian.   
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Since the late 1980s, the literary genre of memoirs has grown in popularity worldwide.  
There is greater acceptance of and interest in women’s voices and women’s experiences.  Indeed, 
women authors have begun to change the genre as a whole.1 Iranian women have taken up 
memoir writing in response to the tumultuous recent history of their country and their own 
difficult experiences.  In particular, women who left Iran and went into exile have contributed 
many accounts.  This thesis provides insight into not only women’s experiences as expressed in 
their memoirs but also women’s identities as part of the political and historical context in which 
they are written.  
  
1.1 Scope of the Thesis  
My thesis explores twelve memoirs of women’s lives in Iran and abroad from the time of 
the Shah through the Islamic Revolution to the last couple of decades of reform and reaction 
under the Islamic Republic.  I have divided the authors of these memoirs into three cohorts.  The 
similarities and variations in the experiences of the women in these cohorts reveal the value of 
memoirs as historical evidence.  These memoirs illuminate changes in their authors’ 
consciousness, sense of self, identity, and sense of belonging as an individual person, as a 
woman, and as an Iranian.   
My first cohort is composed of Iranian women who were born between the years of 1921 
and 1946, lived in Iran during the last decades of the Monarchy, and left for exile prior to, or 
around the same time as the Revolution. They all lived in Iran under the Shah, a time of 
                                                 
1 Carolyn Heilbrun, “Contemporary Memoirs: or Who Cares Who Did What to Whom,” The American Scholar 66, 
no. 3 (1999): 35.  
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accelerating change and deepening conflict. The particular questions that guide my reading of 
these women’s memoirs are the following.  How do their childhoods and familial structures 
compare to one another?  How did their upbringings reveal the influence of life circumstances 
such as class, education, and occupation?  How did they relate to or experience significant 
political events in Iran, such as the White Revolution, the Shah’s “revolution from above,” and 
the Iranian Revolution? 
My second cohort is composed of Iranian women who were born between the years of 
1947 and 1969, went through the Iranian Revolution, and lived under the Islamic Republic until 
going into exile. How do their life experiences as young adults compare to one another? How did 
they relate to or experience the Islamization of society and culture during the Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s leadership of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s and 1990s? 
My third cohort is composed of a new generation of Iranian women born on the eve of 
the Iranian Revolution or in the years after the foundation of the Islamic Republic. This last 
group is different from the first and second because it includes women who have lived most of 
their lives in the worldwide Iranian diaspora, in countries such as U.S. or France, and observed 
the experience of exile through their parents or other older relatives. As a result, these 
individuals share the perspective of a mixed cultural identity and the experience of diasporic life, 
in which the performance of gender or religion may diverge significantly from the public norms 
of the Islamic Republic. How did these women’s exilic families and communities influence their 
understanding of Iran? How did they experience major Iranian political events such as the 
political oscillations of the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in the failed Green Revolution? What 
role does their diasporic identity play in their relationships with peers in Iran? 
3 
These questions will allow me to analyze each memoir, compare the memoirs in each 
cohort, and, in my Conclusion, compare all three cohorts. This thesis contextualizes these 
sources, by revealing similarities and differences over time, from the rule of the last Shah to the 
upheaval of the Revolution to the unending tensions of the Republic.  Some of the commonalities 
and changes that bind and divide generations of Iranian women will be revealed. 
 
1.2 The Historical Background of Women in Modern Iran  
The study of women’s and gender history has expanded rapidly since the 1970s. More 
recently, scholars such as Lila Abu-Lughod, Margot Badran, Beth Baron, Marilyn Booth, 
Mounira Charrad, Haleh Esfandiari, Deniz Kandiyoti, Valentine Moghadam, Afsaneh 
Najmabadi, Parvin Paidar, Lisa Pollard, Eliz Sanasarian, and Elizabeth Thompson have produced 
numerous historical, ethnographic, and cultural studies of women in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and the 
Middle East.2  The historical context of these works is analyzed here. First, it is important to 
outline the modern history of Iran before the 1970s, starting with the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) 
and extending to the overthrow of Mosaddegh in 1953 and the rise of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
(d. 1980). At that point I will continue the story of Iran as seen through the memoirs of twelve 
                                                 
2 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Margot Badran, Feminists, 
Islam, and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, 
Gender, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); 
Marilyn Booth, May Her Likes be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001); Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001);Haleh Esfandiari, Reconstructed Lives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Deniz Kandiyoti, 
Women, Islam, and the State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); Valentine Moghadam, Globalization 
and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2012); Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual 
Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Parvin Paidar, Women and Political 
Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the 
Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Thompson, Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional 
Government in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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Iranian women.  I highlight moments when the histories of Iranian women and Iranian history 
after 1953 have intersected.  
 Qajar society stubbornly adhered to traditions and rhymes, and their religious rhetoric. 
Nonetheless, important changes occurred in this era.3 Ottoman reforms and British imperial rule 
over India and Egypt influenced Iran. So did internal developments, such as the emergence of the 
minority Bahai faith, with its belief in the equality of men and women in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Without question, one of the most distinctive characteristics attributed to the Qajar 
Dynasty is patriarchy in the family, the clergy, and the monarchy.4 It was typical for wealthy and 
middle-class families in Qajar Iran to live in extended, patriarchal households. The head of the 
household was the oldest member, and, in most cases, everyone was supposed to obey his 
decision; in theory, the father was the ultimate source of authority regardless of class. 5 
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cultural and political conflict and 
change become more pronounced. This period of unrest was marked by two events, the protests 
against the foreign tobacco concession in 1890, which became a mass movement, and the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, which established a parliamentary government for the 
first time in Iran.  Women emerged as significant and influential in both events. They not only 
engaged in national uprisings, but also mandated the reform of women’s social, legal, and 
political position.6 However, women did not win the vote.7 Nevertheless, women inserted 
                                                 
3 B. Rabiee and S. Jalalpoor, “Development of Cultural Construction and Constitutional Revolution in Iran,” Journal 
of History Culture and Art Research 6, no. 4 (2017): 1144. 
4 Raibee and Jalalpoor, “Development of Cultural Construction and Constitutional Revolution in Iran,” 1141.  
5 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Women’s Worlds in Qajar Iran Digital Archive and Website,” Perspectives on History 
(November 2013): 246. 
6 Deleram, Farzaneh, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: A brief History of the Legal Discriminations Against 
Women in Iran and the Violation of International Human Rights,” Annual Survey of International and Comparative 
Law 20, no. 1 (2014): 208.  
7 Sarah Sheibani and Siva Jalapour, “Historical Approach to the Role of Women in the Legislation of Iran,” Journal 
of HIstory, Art, and Culture 5, no. 4 (2016): 296.  
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themselves into the public arena and established their own anjomans (nationalist groups) and a 
women’s newspaper.8 
 A few years later, the Constitutional Revolution came to an end.  Britain and Russia 
divided much of Iran into rival spheres of influence, not least because of the discovery of oil in 
Iran.  An ally of the Ottoman empire, Germany expanded its influence in Iran in the course of the 
First World War disruptions, including revolts, discredited the Qajar dynasty and the Iranian 
government.  After the First World War, nationalist movements and armed groups contended for 
power.  The British supported the self-made Cossack Brigade commander, Reza Khan.  He was 
able to displace political rivals and gather power largely in his hands.9 
 After the coup d’etat in February 1921, Reza Khan made a strong public appeal for his 
rule:  
Our aim is to establish a government that will not plunder the treasury. A strong 
government, that will create a powerful and respected army, because a strong army is the 
only means of saving the country from the miserable state of its affairs. We want to 
establish a government that will not discriminate among Gilanis, Tabrizis, and Kermanis. 
We want to establish a government that will not be an instrument of foreign.10  
He insisted that nationalism would unite the divided factions throughout Iran. Further, he blamed 
the state of the country on the interference of foreign powers, and political leaders who acted as 
their pawns. He also used the symbol of women and secularization in his agenda.  
                                                 
8  Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 77. 
9 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 88. 
10 Quoted in M. Reza Ghods, “Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah,” Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 1 (January 
1991): 30. 
6 
By 1921 Reza Khan was in position to demand even greater power.  Unable to persuade 
Iranians to establish a presidential republic, he successfully founded a new dynasty and 
monarchy.11  As Reza Shah, he made modernization of Iran a top priority for his regime. One of 
his beliefs was that the condition of women was central to achieving a modern society.  He 
abolished the veil in 1936 and sent his wife and daughters out in public without their veils. 
Women began wearing western-style dress, which became a symbol of modernization. Reza 
Khan also instituted major reforms in women’s education. The year after Tehran University was 
re-founded in 1934, women were permitted to attend. Although their circumstances were less 
than ideal, the presence of women in higher education was significant and foreshadowed 
growing female participation in public and professional life.12  
 As in the period of the Constitutional Revolution, women in Reza Shah’s Iran failed to 
gain political rights.  This lack of rights was the case for men as well as women. Women 
connected to the Pahlavi court enjoyed some influence and prestige, but the Shah determined the 
nature and extent of any reforms for women. Reza Shah’s political authoritarianism and Iranian 
men’s support for traditional gender roles and relations severely limited what passed for the 
modernization of state and society.13 
 In 1941, Reza Shah refused to break ties to Nazi Germany and his reign subsequently 
ended. British and Soviet forces invaded Iran and forced him to abdicate the throne. He was 
replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza Shah who also held similar beliefs as his father about the 
role of women in society. 14  During this time, U.S. influence in Iran grew because of its role in 
                                                 
11 Ghods, “Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah,” 42. 
12 Seyedeh Shojaei, Ku Samsu, and Hossien Asayeseh, “Women in Politics, a Case Study in Iran,” Journal of 
Politics and Law 3, no. 2 (September 2010): 259. 
13 Shojaei, Samsu, and Asayeseh, “Women in Politics, a Case Study in Iran,” 261. 
14 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 112. 
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the Second World War. Foreign influence in Iran led to volatile politics and an unstable 
economy. The rise of the pro-Soviet, progressive Tudeh (Masses) Party represented a challenge 
to social and political conservatism.  Such seemingly internal struggles carried international 
implications, for Iran’s oil wealth was a target of foreign companies and governments seeking 
advantage in the postwar period. 15   
 In this political opening, women called for freedom, education, and the abolition of 
polygamy and the veil.  Several women’s organizations emerged, including Tashkilaat-e Zanaan-
e Iran (Organization of Iranian Women), Hezb-e Zanaan (Women’s Party), and Jamiat-e Zanaan 
(Women’s League).16  Women’s groups became aligned with political parties and active in the 
struggle against foreign interference, with women taking part in political demonstrations. Their 
demands, however, could not carry the day, given the weight of opposition, especially from most 
of the conservative ulama (clerics).17 Athough some state-sponsored ulama did support the 
reforms.  
In 1951, the new Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, a nationalist and 
populist, succeeded in nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).18  His success 
threatened the power of the Shah. The British-backed AIOC enjoyed a very advantageous sixty-
year concession agreed decades earlier in 1933.19 Mossadegh hoped to capitalize politically on 
nationalization of Iranian oil.20 Instead, his move led to political polarization.21  Moreover, 
                                                 
15 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 118. 
16 Ali Akbar Mahdi, “The Iranian Women’s Movement: A Century Long Struggle,” The Muslim World 94 (October 
2004): 430. 
17 Mahdi, “The Iranian Women’s Movement,” 431. 
18 Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, “Death to the Shah,” History Today 69, no. 4 (2019): 34. 
19 Ervand Abrahamian, Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 265. 
20 Keddie, Roots of Revolution,133. 
21 Randjbar-Daemi, “Death to the Shah,” 34. 
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Britain mobilized Western oil companies against Iran.22  It also enlisted the U.S., arguing that the 
Tudeh Party was behind Mosadegh and preparing to take power. In 1953, capitalism, the Cold 
War, and a coup d’etat brought down Mosaddegh and restored Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to 
the throne, this time with much more power.23 Iranians critical of the subsequent rule of the Shah 
deeply resented American intervention.24  
 Feeling increasingly secure, the Shah moved to curb, if not crush, political and religious 
opposition. Certain women’s organizations were subject to repression as well. However, by the 
1950s, the educated Iranian elite was invested in Western lifestyles and culture. Women were 
employed in the education sector and in nursing and other care professions. These developments 
expanded the constituency for policies that supported at least some of women’s interests.25  In 
fact, women’s organizations aligned with the government thrived.26  As we shall see in this 
thesis, the Shah at the opening of the 1960s was about to renew the modernization of Iran and, 
like his father in the 1930s, believed that women were key to this project. 
 
1.3 Women, Islam, Feminism, and Iran in Scholarship 
Having explored the history of Iran and women before 1953, my thesis now focuses on 
memoirs written after the overthrow of Mosaddegh.  These memoirs are contributions to a 
broader history of women in twentieth- and early twenty-first century Iran.   Several studies have 
helped me frame my own project. For the genre of memoirs by women, there is Carol Heilbrun’s 
                                                 
22 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 134. 
23 Randjbar-Daemi, “Death to the Shah,” 34. 
24 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 141-42. 
25 Shojaei, Samsu, and Asayeseh, “Women in Politics, A Case Study in Iran,” 260. 
26 Mahdi, “The Iranian Women’s Movement,”432. 
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classic Writing a Woman’s Life.27  For analysis on women, Islam, and revolution, there are  Leila 
Ahmed’s Women and Gender in Islam, Lila Abu-Lughod’s Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 
and Haideh Moghissi’s Populism and Feminism in Iran.28   My discussion of these studies 
highlights how they have influenced the direction of my work.  
Carolyn Heilbrun’s Writing a Woman’s Life demonstrates the ways in which women 
share their stories. She argues that women’s lives and the stories of their lives have been 
saturated in the language and power of men.  She argues that “women have been deprived of the 
narratives, or the texts, plots or examples, by which they might assume power over -- take 
control of -- their own lives.” They lack the “power ... to take one’s place in whatever discourse 
is essential to action and the right to have one’s part matter.”29  As a result, these stories tend to 
be either contrived or unrealistic. Few narratives in Britain and the U.S. before the 1970s freely 
and openly addressed the achievements, ambitions, and experiences of women.  Heilbrun’s 
argument has helped me understand the environment in which women wrote, as well as why and 
how they wrote. Writing about the experience of living in a male-dominated society leaves its 
mark on the writing itself. I will foreground examples of this in my own analyses of Iranian 
women’s memoirs.  
Like Heilbrun, Leila Ahmed’s Women and Gender in Islam discusses power dynamics 
between men and women and women’s negotiation of their own voices. She covers the status 
and treatment of women from pre-Islamic Mesopotamia to the contemporary Middle East. The 
coming of Islam both improved and diminished the freedom of women. Significantly, as it 
                                                 
27 Carolyn Heilbrun, Writing a Woman’s Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 5. 
28 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 1; 
Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 4; 
Haideh Moghissi, Populism and Feminism in Iran (Basingtsroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 7. 
29 Heilbrun, Writing a Woman’s Life, 17-18. 
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spread, Islam adopted many misogynistic practices of the peoples and societies it incorporated 
into the new faith and polity.  
Ahmed’s most intriguing assertion is that “Islam encompasses two distinct voices and 
two competing understandings of gender.” 30  On the one hand, there is the pragmatic regulation 
of society, such as the sexual hierarchy in the law and institution of Islamic marriage.  On the 
other hand, there is the ethical and spiritual conception of life, such as the notion of the equality 
of believers, which is all too often ignored in conduct and practice. This discrepancy plays out in 
the tensions between Islam and what we call the West, for example, around the situation of 
women.  “The unmistakable presence of ethical egalitarianism,” Ahmed writes, “explains why 
Muslim women frequently insist, often inexplicably to non-Muslims, that Islam is not sexist. 
They hear and read in its sacred text, justly and legitimately, a different message from that heard 
by the makers and enforcers of orthodox, androcentric Islam.”31 Ahmed’s attention to conflicted 
views and experiences of Muslim women will help me read Iranian women’s memoirs with 
greater sensitivity.  
 Lila Abu-Lughod’s thought-provoking book Do Muslim Women Need Saving? explores 
the political discourse around the Western notion that Muslim women need to be protected or 
rescued from Islam and Muslim men. An anthropologist whose fieldwork in the Middle East has 
illuminated Muslim women’s situations, Abu-Lughod carefully investigates the intellectual, 
political, and cultural institutions and rhetoric that bolster this moral crusade to save Muslim 
women.32  The Western call to save Muslim women ignores the complexities of cultural 
difference and projects unexamined Western beliefs onto little understood Middle Eastern 
                                                 
30 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 66. 
31 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 66. 
32 Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 4. 
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societies.  Western countries have even gone to war in the region in the name of “saving Muslim 
women.”33Abu-Lughod’s concerns are relevant to my topic because many memoirs reveal that 
Iranian women in Iran or in exile had to contend with Western norms and misconceptions and 
the ways that both the Shah and the Islamic Republic made use of these Western assumptions for 
their political agendas.   
 Turning from the Middle East and the Muslim world in general and to Iran in particular, 
Haideh Moghissi’s Populism and Feminism in Iran asks the question why the Iranian left was 
inadequately prepared to address questions of gender and sexuality at the time of the Iranian 
Revolution and how this led to the degradation of women’s rights in the early years of the 
Islamic Republic. A former revolutionary activist, Moghissi writes from a deeply personal 
standpoint and her study conveys the disillusionment that accompanied the transformation of a 
popular revolution against the monarchy into a repressive regime that re-subordinated women.34  
 She begins by discussing the women’s movement in early twentieth-century Iran, and the 
reforms favoring women’s rights under the Pahlavi Dynasty. She then analyzes the gendered 
discourses of political organizations representing populist Shi’ism, socialism, and secular, 
intellectual liberalism before the 1978-79 Revolution. Finally, she examines the Fadayan, the 
largest and most popular leftist organization of the Revolution. She connects the ideas and 
rhetoric of both secular and religious-conservative male-dominated groups regarding traditional 
gender roles, which helps explain why leftist organizations became increasingly silent as the 
Islamic regime restricted women’s rights. Although leftists was not entirely indifferent to 
women’s rights, she makes it clear that the left was anti-feminist and shortsighted about the 
importance of women in making a revolution that would not simply exchange the rule of the 
                                                 
33 Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 55. 
34 Moghissi, Populism and Feminism in Iran, 15. 
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Pahlavis for the rule of Islamists.35  Populism and Feminism in Iran provides more evidence of 
women’s expectations of the revolution and the disappointments in what it eventually brought 
about.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
My objective in this thesis is to analyze the ways female Iranian exiles exhibit 
commonalities and differences in their description of life in Iran and exile. In search of this goal, 
I investigate the memoirs of twelve female Iranian exiles. Said individuals are categorized into 
three cohorts - divided by time period and shared experiences. My chapters are arranged 
chronologically, beginning in chapter two with a focus on female Iranian exiles that are women 
of the Shah. Subsequently, I progress in chapter three to the following decades of women of the 
Islamic Republic. My fourth chapter explores individuals of the new generation, who 
experienced modern political events such as the Green Revolution (2009-10 CE). I conclude my 
thesis with a comparison of each cohort.  
 Each chapter is divided and organized with the presentation of its memoirs in 
chronological order. I begin each chapter with the historical context relevant to the specific 
cohort, then present and analyze each memoir and memoirist in their individual context. I 
conclude with comparisons of their expressions of experience to illustrate their commonalities as 
well as differences in class and background. Finally, in the conclusion of my thesis, I discuss the 
similarities and differences between each cohort and their expressions of experience. In doing so, 
I ask the following questions: how do the different generations of female Iranian exiles share 
their experiences of life in Iran and exile? What differences are evident, and how do they 
                                                 
35 Moghissi, Populism and Feminism in Iran, 30. 
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influence their expressions of experience? What conclusions can be drawn from these 
individual’s consciousness, sense of self, identity, and/or sense of belonging (as an individual 
person, a woman, an Iranian)?  
 Ultimately, there are both overall similarities and individual differences between the 
experiences, and expressions of experiences, of female Iranian exiles. Through careful 
investigation and analysis, I present evidence of these similarities. In doing so, I illuminate a 
unique perspective in the historical narrative of modern Iran, through the medium of memoirs 
that are both public and private.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO: WOMEN OF THE SHAH 
The focus of this chapter is female Iranian exiles who experienced life in Iran under the 
Shah, prior to the Revolution. I’ve selected four women as representative of their counterparts. 
These are Persian Girls, by Nahid Rachlin, The Good Daughter by Jasmin Darznik, Daughter of 
Persia by Sattareh Farman Farmaian, and An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah by Farah 
Pahlavi. 
These women were born between the years of 1921 and 1946, and left for exile prior to, 
or around the same time as, the Revolution. Despite their distinctive backgrounds, they shared in 
the experience of the White Revolution, and the various reforms it either provided or imposed on 
Iranian women. Their experiences of the White Revolution depend on their class, education, and 
other circumstances. Despite these differences, these individuals still maintain great similarities 
in their expressions of experience. Their memoirs are best understood when contextualized in 
terms of this era in Iranian history.  
 
2.1 Modernization and the White Revolution  
A central objective of Mohammad Reza Shah was to strengthen the “three pillars on 
which he built his state - the military, the bureaucracy, and the court patronage system. Starting 
in 1953, the Shah embarked on fulfilling his father’s dream to build a massive state 
infrastructure.”36 These dreams were largely funded by increasing Iranian oil revenues. In the 
course of the quarter century between 1953 and 1978, “oil revenues provided Iran with over $55 
billion, and on average, gave the government more than sixty percent of its revenues, and more 
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than seventy percent of its foreign exchange.”37 These changes forged Iran into a state bolstered 
on petroleum.  
In his expansion of the state, the Shah focused much of his attention on security. 
Significantly, his relationship with the United States remained particularly close, which aided in 
this expansion. Consequently, the alliance would inspire tensions amongst Iranians which 
eventually culminated in the Revolution.38 The military’s budget grew from “$60 million in 1954 
to $7.3 billion in 1977,” and its troops strength increased as well.39 The Shah became notorious 
for silencing opposition. He would either employ the service of SAVAK to enact repression or 
supply employment to his opposition in exchange for their silence.40 The Shah placed his hand in 
economic matters through the third pillar of the state, court patronage.  
In 1963, the Shah put forward a series of reforms, which are classified as the White 
Revolution. These reforms included land reform, financing land reform, literacy, education, and, 
most importantly for this thesis, the enfranchisement of women. Although the reforms were 
enacted under the banner of modernization, the Shah undoubtedly had political motives for the 
changes. First, he believed the White Revolution would legitimize the Pahlavi Dynasty. 
Secondly, he saw the reforms as a means to reduce the power and influence of social classes, 
who favored their former democratic system.41  
Perhaps the most significant set of reforms enacted by the White Revolution were the 
land reforms, which opened up opportunities for small farmers and rural women. They limited 
the number of villages an individual landlord could hold. Instead, the land would be contracted 
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for cash by the government. According to Said Amir Arjomand in, The Turban for the Crown, 
“these changes liquidated the landlords as a class, and landowning families, including the tribal 
chiefs, lost their socio-legal base, and were liquidated as a class as well. Such transformations 
were significant because they undercut the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was 
the power basis for the landlord class.” 42 As such, it had an impact on the traditional patriarchal 
structures of previous decades, which were based, to some extent on rural agriculture. An 
unintended consequence of withholding land from the agricultural classes was mass migration 
from the countryside to the cities. This migration caused severe socio-economic stress. which 
would eventually contribute to the Iranian Revolution in 1979.  
The tensions generated by the White Revolution are best understood through the realms 
of education and industrialization. Between 1953 and 1977, Iran’s education system grew 
tenfold. The growth in industrialization was equally impressive. Such expansion, coupled with 
the growth of the state bureaucracy, increased the ranks of two modern classes; the salaried 
middle classes and the urban proletariat. In 1953, the middle class had composed only 5.4 
percent of the country’s labor force, but by 1977, the number had increased to nearly 6.7 percent. 
The working class was 5 percent of the country’s labor force in 1953, but over 14 percent by 
1977.43 These statistics suggest the tempo of the economic growth under the Shah. Despite this 
growth, however, the gap between the well-to-do and worker widened. Nonetheless, the growth 
of the middle class, if small, allowed for education of a wider swath of society and access to 
education for a larger number of women.  
The White Revolution led to progress in the spheres of health, education, and public 
welfare. Although these great strides were made for many Iranians, the quality of life for many 
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Iranians did not improve dramatically. For instance, even though the literacy rate rose from 26 to 
42 percent, millions of the adult population remained illiterate.44  
 
2.2 Women and the White Revolution 
The reforms of the White Revolution included the enfranchisement of women and other 
reforms favorable to women. However, this came at a price. Women were not exempt from the 
authoritarian patriarchy of the Pahlavi regime.45 As with other elements of his agenda, the Shah 
maintained all political control through repression and intimidation. Although women were 
granted suffrage in 1963, their vote was largely irrelevant, given they lived in a society which 
denied basic human rights and freedom, and excluded its citizens from decision-making 
processes. Specific changes in women’s economic, legal, and political status eventually spurred 
their involvement in the Revolution because they were largely superficial, and only impacted a 
small portion of the population.46 In examining these reforms, the possibilities and limitations for 
women under the Shah are highlighted. 
Economic growth proved to be particularly influential on the status of women during the 
Pahlavi period. Iran engaged in the global economy and filtered more power to the state. More 
women, now unveiled and educated, joined the growing labor market. Emboldened by the new 
position of the state, and the move away from tradition, many middle- and upper-class women 
earned substantial freedom and autonomy over their own lives.47 So, economic, social, and 
gender shifts of the Pahlavi era led to political shifts in regard to women’s status. The policies in 
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the White Revolution addressed gender issues in an effort to facilitate the participation of women 
in the labor market.48    
As a result, reforms on divorce, child custody, and polygamy were introduced during this 
time. The Family Protection Act (FPA) was passed by the Majlis in 1967, and slightly modified 
the civil codes in favor for women. Divorce became subject to court approval, and afforded 
women the same right as men to initiate divorce proceedings. The court was also granted 
authority over child custody rights. Although polygamy was not outlawed entirely, an additional 
wife now required the approval of a first man’s wife. Despite advances, women’s rights were 
highly restrictive. For instance, divorced women were not entitled to alimony, and their 
inheritance rights remained half of what was afforded to men.49  
Women’s respect and social positions were still tied to the men in their lives. Divorced or 
single women struggled to exist outside of the familial structure. Furthermore, although women 
had begun to enter the labor market, most were far from economically independent from their 
male counterparts. Consequently, many Iranian women in poorer households were deprived of 
the benefit of economic change.50 
The Shah’s reforms were implemented in a religiously conservative society, with a harsh 
division in the class structure. The reforms were contingent on the women’s economic 
independence from men and on their class status. Thus, the majority of women were largely 
unaffected by the promises of the White Revolution. They experienced a lack of agency in issues 
of divorce, child custody, and polygamy, despite living through the modernization of the White 
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Revolution. These difficulties are exemplified in the memoirs The Good Daughter, Persian 
Girls, Daughter of Persia, and An Enduring Love. 
 
2.3 The Good Daughter 
Jasmin Darznik was born in Tehran in 1973 to a German father and Iranian mother. They 
brought her to the U.S. shortly before the Revolution at the age of five in 1978. She holds a B.A. 
in English from UCLA and a PhD from Princeton University. She is a writer and professor at 
California College of the Arts.  
Darznik knew little about her family’s past in Iran. After her father’s passing in her early 
twenties, she discovered a photograph of a young Iranian girl dressed as a bride, standing next to 
an older man. She remarks that the girl could not have been older than fourteen, and her 
astonishment grew as she realized that the girl in the photograph was her mother, and she had 
once been this stranger’s bride.51  
When Darznik asked her mother of the photograph, she was told that it had nothing to do 
with her. However, shortly after, she returned to her home on the other side of the U.S., she 
began to receive tapes from her mother, telling the origins of their family in Iran. She recounts 
them as a memoir in The Good Daughter.  
The text is organized by Jasmin’s mother, Lili’s life events include childhood, education, 
marriage, divorce, higher education, second marriage, Revolution, and exile. The style is unique 
as the narrator is not first person until the end when Jasmin grows into an adult. However, she 
writes from the perspective of Lili as if it were her own. She explains this style in the final 
chapter.  
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For Lili, family and marriage were the cornerstones of her life. They drove her education, 
career, and travels, in a way which illustrates that her life was never of her own but belonged to 
those who she valued most.  Lili touches on several political events in Iran, such as the White 
Revolution. However, her response is less than emphatic, as she seems to acknowledge its 
occurrence, but remains steady in her own traditions. She even characterizes the Revolution as 
“whispers.” As she lived prior to the gender reforms of the White Revolution, her experiences 
with women’s rights, or lack thereof, were evident through her experience with divorce, child 
care, and polygamy.  
For instance, Lili became pregnant shortly into her first marriage, and had a daughter 
named Sara, with her abusive and neglectful first husband. 52 Lili soon learned that her husband 
suffered from a mental illness, and she had no choice but to leave.53 However as this was in 
1953, prior to the White Revolution, Lili was unable to access the reforms in the FPL, which 
granted women access to divorce proceedings. She was only granted a divorce, after pleading 
with her father to request it on her behalf.54 
 Her status following the divorce illustrated the status of women prior to the White 
Revolution. She explains the implications of their decision, and father’s hesitancy in the 
following: “I had nothing, I was no one. A divorcee was considered no better than a prostitute 
back then.”55Although divorce was permitted under the Pahlavi era, women’s status was still tied 
to their male counterparts, and they struggled to exist outside of the familial structure.56 These 
were further illustrated in the legal decisions that were made, following the divorce. Despite the 
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abuse, her husband kept control of the family finances, as well as custody of their daughter Sara. 
Lili would continue to fight for custody for the rest of her life in Iran.57  Such issues evolved 
after the White Revolution reforms in 1963, as did her status as an Iranian woman.  
In the days following their divorce, Lili worked to elevate her status, as to earn rights to 
her daughter. She was sent to Germany to stay with her brother and earn an education, as well as 
gain a new life.58After her studies, Lili returned to Iran, where she learned that her in-laws had 
taken Sara out of school, and by Lili’s standards, turned her into a servant.  In response, Lili set 
out in search of jobs as a midwife, with the determination to get Sara back into school. Lili 
succeeded, and was able to send Sara to a private boarding school in the suburb of Semoran. Her 
ex-husband allowed it, and Lili supported Sara for many years throughout her studies.59 
Lili’s access to her daughter evolved with the reforms of the White Revolution, as well as 
her upward social mobility through education and paid employment. The FPL modified civil 
rights for women in Iran. In Lili’s case, access was restricted to her ex-husband.60 Further, her 
access was driven by her economic status, which allowed her to contribute to her daughter and 
ex-husband monetarily. Such was often a unique privilege in this period, as financially 
independent women, were almost exclusively from upper-class communities.  
 
2.4 Persian Girls 
Persian Girls, a memoir by Nahid Rachlin, depicts the lives of herself and her sister Pari 
growing up in Iran, and then traces their drastically different lives following adolescence. Nahid 
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Rachlin was born to an upper-class Iranian family but was raised for a time by her maternal aunt, 
as she could not have children and her sister pitied her. She was then taken back by her father as 
a young girl at the age of nine. She went from sleeping on the floor in a tent with a traditional 
Muslim upbringing to living in a moderately progressive household, well off with money. She 
was close with her sister, Pari, and they both dreamed of marrying for love and abandoning the 
restrictions that came with much of Iranian culture.  
Rachlin was sent to study in America, where she struggled with her identity as an Iranian 
and then as an American. She went to graduate school and met her husband, Howie - a Jewish 
American. Neither of them subscribed to the beliefs of their religious upbringings and married at 
city hall, without the permission or presence of their families. Her memoir is structured into three 
parts, corresponding to her residences in Iran and America. Her memoir covers the time from her 
childhood to the death of her sister Pari. The entirety of the text is focused on her relationships 
with her family, primarily her sister and her maternal aunt. These are above all the most 
important influences in her life, and all things point to them. 61  
Rachlin continuously relates her life to the timeline of political history in Iran. She writes 
of the White Revolution, SAVAK, censorship, the Revolution, and the Iranian Hostage Crisis. 
The memoir is characterized by the juxtaposition of Pari’s life events with those of Raclin’s. It 
becomes apparent that Pari was one of the women who did not reap the benefits of the reforms of 
the White Revolution, while Rachlin, in contrast, became a beneficiary.  
The reforms of the FPL failed to extend to women who were not financially independent 
from their husbands, as was Pari in the mid-1960s.62 Pari was married around the time of the 
White Revolution. However, shortly into their marriage her husband became abusive, and she 
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pleaded with her father to petition for a divorce. Her requests were denied, and several years later 
she wrote to Rachlin about the difficulty of her situation:  
You know how impossible it would be for me to do it alone … how would I make a 
living? I would be penniless … Jobs wouldn’t come easy to a young divorced woman 
here and the same with trying to rent a place and living alone, even if I could afford it … 
A divorced woman living alone practically has the status of a prostitute.63 
Pari’s letter epitomizes the shortcomings of gender reforms during the White Revolution. 
Meanwhile, the reforms on women’s education seemingly provided Rachlin with an entirely 
different life.  
Much of the White Revolution focused on gender reforms and education for Iranian 
women. In 1965, the Women’s Organization of Iran undertook activities such as literacy classes, 
vocational training, and subsidiary programs in childcare, in an effort to educate and mobilize 
Iranian women.64 Further, over the years of the White Revolution, education became more 
accessible to women. They became students at schools and universities, with the number of 
students increasing from 71,718 in 1941 to 1,816,560 in 1975. 65  
Growing up in the Shah’s Iran, Rachlin was afforded greater opportunities for education 
as a woman. Raclin’s father placed a heavy emphasis on her education from an early age, 
sending her to the best private schools in Ahaz. She excelled, but her father initially refused to 
consider sending her abroad for higher education even though he afforded this opportunity to her 
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older brothers.66 Their success in America spurred her to work harder, upon receiving first rank 
in her class.67  
Eventually, Rachlin asked her father outright to send her to America for college. He 
advised that she already knew that the answer was no. However, upon intervention from one of 
her brothers, he changed his mind and sent Rachlin abroad for higher education. Her path as well 
as Pari’s were decisively affected by the reforms for women under the White Revolution. Thus, 
the memoir reflects the possibilities for women during the White Revolution. There are several 
other memoirs from female Iranian exiles that reflect similar experiences. I discuss one of them 
in the following section. 
 
2.5 Daughter of Persia  
Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from Her Father’s Harem through the Islamic 
Revolution by Sattareh Farman-Farmaian focuses on the author’s unique perspective on the 
political and social disorder of twentieth-century Iran. Sattareh is the fifteenth of thirty-six 
children born to a Qajar prince by a wife who was a commoner. In 1944, she traveled to the U.S., 
where she became the first Iranian ever to study at the University of Southern California. After 
her education, she was employed by the United Nations and in 1958 she erected The Tehran 
School of Social Work.68 “The institution was dedicated to the training of skilled social workers, 
a category of professional people then unknown to Iran.”69  
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After the Revolution of 1979, after serving the Iranian people for two decades, Sattareh 
was arrested as a counterrevolutionary and branded an imperialist by Ayatollah Khomeini's 
followers. She was subsequently forced to leave Iran and settled in California where she wrote 
her memoir as to fashion greater understanding between her Western and Iranian friends on the 
nature and complexity of Persian Society. 70 The text as a whole, serves its purpose in 
representing Iranian Women, as well as recounting her own experience of twentieth century Iran. 
The memoir covers Sattareh’s life from childhood of to her time of exile. It weaves 
together the personal and political, as she frequently associates pieces of her life with larger 
events, such as the fall of the Qajar Dynasty, her family’s relations and experiences with Prime 
Minister Mosadegh, the changes of the Shah’s modernization, and the Revolution.  Sattareh 
references the influence of her family frequently, with regard to her education, travel and 
residence abroad, and experience of repression during the Revolution. However, she focuses 
more on her duty as an Iranian and her devotion to her people. This reflects her sense of self as 
an Iranian woman.71 
Sattareh could not ignore political affairs in Iran. She positions her social work 
experience in relation to the turmoil in her country. She writes of her awkward relationship with 
the Pahlavis, as they supported her work, but she did not agree with their methods of rule. Even 
though she remained quiet on most political issues, she found herself at odds with the 
revolutionaries who came to power in 1979 and ultimately drove her into exile.   
Sattareh cites the U.S as influencing her with notions of freedom, self-determination, and 
selfless support for the people of Iran.72 Although she is shocked by much of the liberal behavior 
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observed at her University, she maintains her identity as a Persian, while gaining positive ideas 
and examples from her new environment. She describes the ways in which she is changed by her 
students and by her experiences as a social worker. For example, she notes her disappointment 
with their desire to earn a high salary, rather than live a life of service.73  
There are interesting parallels between Sattareh’s memoir and The Good Daughter and 
Persian Girls. Sattareh is highly affected by Shah’s White Revolution and the process of 
modernization that followed. The Tehran School of Social Work’s educational research 
programs were influential across Iran. In 1961, on the eve of the White Revolution, the Shah’s 
wife Farah Diba began to visit the municipal institutions that were run by Sattareh’s school. 
These centers were established in the countryside and assisted Iranians with child care, 
education, and other basic needs. Farah saw that the regime funded these centers with enough 
money to provide a full-time permanent staff. In return, Sattareh ensured Farah would be in 
attendance for the school’s commencement ceremonies. 74 
The relationship between Sattareh and the Pahlavi regime became problematic in 1963, 
as the White Revolution began to unfold. She recalls her elation at the news that the regime had 
committed to improvements for human development, but this elation quickly turned to 
frustration as the Shah arrested the entire National Front leadership because they protested the 
effectiveness of such reforms. Subsequently, riots broke out in the city of Qom, and Sattareh’s 
social workers were largely responsible for the relief efforts which followed. She calls the 
incident a tragedy, and emphasizes with the difficult position of many Iranians, who could not 
speak against the Pahlavi regime, but were disheartened at his actions.75 
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The 1963 disturbances boosted the fortune of Sattareh’s school. The relief efforts of her 
social workers forced favor with the Pahlavi regime, the school received a permanent budget, 
improved infrastructure, and greater resources.76 It is significant, that she was critical of the 
Shah’s autocratic behavior, despite the benefits she gained from her connections with the 
Pahlavis. The school continued to grow, and in 1966, Queen Farah, upon a visit to its family 
planning center, increased her interest in community welfare.77 Unlike other memoirists who 
were affected by the White Revolution, Sattareh actually affected the White Revolution. In this 
sense, she is comparable to the last memoirist discussed in this chapter.  
 
2.6 An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah  
Farah Pahlavi, born Farah Diba in 1938, served alongside her husband Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, as the queen of Iran from 1959 to 1979. 78 The culmination of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 saw the pair overthrown and exiled. The tumultuous period which led to the 
Revolution inspires the content of her memoir An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah. Of 
particular interest, Pahlavi describes her position during the White Revolution, when she 
personally saw to the implementation of many of its reforms.   
Pahlavi is different from her counterparts, because of her status as a prominent figure in 
the Pahlavi Dynasty. She received many privileges and much autonomy. For instance, she 
undertook many humanitarian initiatives, traveling throughout her country and learning various 
needs of their people, from medical aid to childcare. She refers to herself as a “soldier of the 
White Revolution.”79 
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Farah Diba was born in Tehran in 1938 to an upper-class family. She was an only child. 
Her grandfather was a diplomat, and her father was an officer in the Iranian Armed Forces. She 
notes the special bond she had with her father and was deeply affected by his death in 1948. 
Subsequently, her family experienced financial difficulties and lived in a small apartment in 
northern Tehran.80 The family was heavily invested in her education. She started at Tehran’s 
Italian School and then moved to a French boarding school for art at the age of 16 to study 
architecture. She was sponsored by the state. In fact, the Shah made frequent visits to the 
students, which is how he met Farah and they entered into a formal courtship. They married 
shortly afterwards and produced a male heir.81  
The memoir is divided into three parts, dealing with her childhood, education, and her 
reign as the Empress of Iran. It is apparent that one of her main objectives is to elevate the life 
and leadership of her husband and remove him from responsibility for the Revolution.82 
Pahlavi is blindly unaware of growing opposition, not only in Iran, but also abroad. This 
is illustrated when she recounts an episode in which she and the Shah encountered protests 
during a visit to the White House in 1977. According to her, "President Carter and his wife 
begged us to forget the incident -- they were truly embarrassed -- but I thought to myself that in 
Richard Nixon's time the demonstrators would never have been allowed to come so close to 
us."83 
As with the other memoirists in this chapter, Pahlavi’s life was inseparably linked with 
the events of the White Revolution. Given her status, however, she experiences these events 
from the inside. She did not participate in the initial years of the reforms, 1963-1965, due to the 
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birth of her children, but she became active soon afterwards. When writing of the White 
Revolution, and her husband’s modernization goals, she recalls her own childhood. Although she 
came from privilege, she remembers the poverty of Iran in her childhood and notes that it was 
imperative for Iran’s development that they combat poverty with the same determination 
observed in Western countries.84 
Pahlavi committed herself to the White Revolution because of her professed love for her 
country. She was confident that this was the perfect opportunity to serve her country. The first 
campaign she carried out was against leprosy. She had been unaware that the disease was an 
issue in Iran. She visited the Leper Center in Tabriz. She recalls that she had never experienced 
such a feeling of humiliation and horror at the residents’ treatment and was determined to 
improve their conditions. She hired medical specialists to investigate ways to improve their 
treatment, while simultaneously working to find better options for housing. Pahlavi worked with 
her husband to establish a village for these individuals, and notes that they received enough land 
in Gorgan province to house a community of over a thousand. The community was so successful 
that other people with leprosy began to visit the village to take advantage of its modern 
amenities. Pahlavi continued to visit the community regularly. She highlights the influence she 
had, specifically as an Iranian woman. 85 
As the White Revolution continued, Farah began to travel throughout her country alone 
to understand its problems and envision solutions. Her security had trouble with her way of 
traveling, as she preferred to speak with individuals and such close contact was distressing to 
those responsible for her safety.86 Pahlavi found that her work could be exhausting. It made her 
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more aware of what the village women endured. She loved these trips because she was in touch 
with the real Iran.  
One of her most interesting encounters occurred spontaneously. As she was driving alone 
in the countryside, she came across a woman carrying a very heavy load. She asked if she could 
drive her home. As the woman did not recognize her, they were able to relate to each other as 
Iranian women. She spoke of her difficulties and everyday life. Later, as Pahlavi revealed her 
identity, she helped the woman who had spent her entire life in poverty buy her own house.87 
Stories such as these appear throughout her text, and underline the impact of the White 
Revolution on Pahlavi’s life. Although much of her life was unique, given her position, she 
shares in the gender changes during the modernization process that the other memoirists 
experienced in this chapter.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
In looking at the memoirs of Lili, Nahid Rachlin, Sattareh Farman-Farmaian, and Farah 
Pahlavi, it is apparent that there are remarkable similarities in the descriptions of life under the 
Shah. They emphasize the impact of the White Revolution’s reforms for women. Yet there are 
significant differences in their experiences. 
For example, in The Good Daughter, and Persian Girls, we observe one Iranian woman 
from a lower-middle-class family, and another from an upper-class family. Lili and Rachlin 
share the experience of education, arranged marriages, and most importantly, significant life 
changes stemming from the White Revolution.  
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At the same time, thru took entirely different paths to exile. Rachlin went abroad in the 
mid-1960s to pursue higher education and remained in the U.S. during the upheavals in Iran in 
the 1970s and 1980s. By contrast, Lili remained in Iran for most of her life. Even when she left 
for higher education abroad, she returned to Iran to have a family and to pursue a career for 
many years thereafter. In analyzing and comparing these texts, one thing that stands out is that 
the relationships between Lili and her daughter Jasmin, and Rachlin and her sister Pari make 
their stories more than individual, inward-looking accounts.   
Daughter of Persia, and An Enduring Love take us into the Iranian elite. Sattareh 
Farman-Farmaian, and Farah Pahlavi came from upper-class backgrounds, and knew each other 
socially and professionally. However, their experiences were distinct. Although both held 
prominent positions in the White Revolution, Sattareh benefited from the reforms, whereas Farah 
helped shape them. Sattareh worked in the humanitarian efforts and welfare sector, while Farah 
was a significant political actor in her own right. Perhaps this makes their subsequent 
expressions of exile so poignant. They achieved a lot as women in a patriarchal society, and they 
lost their power and sense of agency when the Shah, on which they depended, was overthrown.  
Finally, all four of the memoirists provide evidence of the impact of the White 
Revolution on women which, although imperfect, still improved the legal status of women. Each 
memoirist marks this period as a high point to their life experiences. Despite significant 
differences, their common shared identity as women meant that their stories reveal hardships and 
breakthroughs that a gender analysis can illuminate.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: WOMEN AND KHOMEINI’S IRAN 
The focus of this chapter is female Iranian exiles who experienced life during the Iranian 
Revolution and Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in the 1980s. I’ve selected four women as 
representative of their counterparts, as is shown through their memoirs. These memoirs are Iran 
Awakening by Shirin Abadi, Reading Lolita in Tehran by Azar Nafisi, The Complete Persepolis 
by Marjane Satrapi, and Journey from the Land of No by Roya Hakakian.  
These individuals were born between the years of 1947 and 1969 and left for exile in the 
early years of the Islamic Republic. This group of women directly experienced the Iranian 
Revolution and the Islamization of life under Khomeini. Their experiences of these events differ 
greatly according to their family, background, class and individual circumstances. In spite of 
these differences, the women maintain remarkable continuity in how they depict their 
experience. The historical context which illuminates these shared experiences encompasses the 
Iranian Revolution and the formation of Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. 
 
3.1 The Iranian Revolution 
The historian Errand Abrahamian describes this revolution as one of the most dramatic 
revolutions in the modern age.88 Internal forces, unaided by outside armies, took down the 
foundations of the Pahlavi regime, through popular demonstrations and general strikes. Women 
were a major force for change during the revolution. Many mobilized against the Shah prior to 
the start of the Revolution. The monarchy, so tied to the West, was replaced just months later by 
the Islamic Republic - an autocratic, Islamic government, which was voted in by a nationwide 
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referendum with ninety seven percent support.89 The reasons for the Revolution and the 
unparalleled turn of events lie in the nation’s political history.  
The lack of support for the Shah was not inherent, but rather an accumulation of 
widespread frustration after decades of socioeconomic development, political underdevelopment, 
and popular oppression.90 In the 1970s, leading up to the Revolution, the Shah made several 
steps towards dictatorship. He abolished the two-party system in Parliament and replaced it with 
the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) party in March of 1975. Within a few months, the party had created 
bodies for farmers, women, youth, and industrial workers - with the intent to ensure that all 
aspects of Iranian life were in line with the objectives of the Shah.91 These changes affected 
women in particular and resulted in their radicalization during the Revolution.   
The Rastakhiz attacked the ulama in particular. This divide of state and the religious elite 
made larger portions of Iranian society to feel threatened.92 One of them was the cleric Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini who had been a critic of the Shah since the early 1960s. Things were only 
made worse by the mysterious death of Khomeini’s son in 1977. He called for “death to the 
Shah.” Although he was in exile, his followers began to protest in his place in the City of Qom.   
By 1976, the economy was overheating. Inflation was particularly high on items such as food 
and housing. The Shah blamed profiteering by shopkeepers.93  
Protests escalated in many cities in 1978. By September, troops opened fire on 
demonstrators and the prospects of a negation settlement disappeared. 94 The final weeks of 1978 
marked the culmination of anti-Shah mobilization as supporters assembled a vast demonstration 
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in Tehran and elsewhere on Ashura.95 It became clear to protesters that it was time for the Shah 
to go. The Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile on 1 February 1979, the remaining 
supporters of the Shah stepped aside, and an Islamic Republic was forged.96 
 
3.2 Women and the Iranian Revolution  
As many Iranian women mobilized against the Shah between 1977 and 1978, religious 
leaders worked closely with the Ayatollah Khomeini to provoke actions, especially from 
religious women, who prior to the Revolution had supported the religious leaders but avoided the 
public arena. The Shi’ite ulama elevated women as symbols of resistance to unjust rule, and 
thereby brought these women into open demonstrations against the Shah. Even younger, 
secularized, female revolutionaries veiled themselves in solidarity with the religious-minded 
masses. The veil became a symbol of defiance against the Shah’s Westernized dictatorship.97 
The demonstrations against the Shah saw engagement with women which spanned over a 
variety of classes and age groups. This participation generally corresponded to the individual’s 
specific characteristics of age, class, and even religious adherence. For instance, younger women 
who were secular leftists or socialist Islamists joined the Organization of Iranian People’s 
Fedayee Guerrillas or the Iranian People’s Mujahedin Organization and took part in armed 
struggle against the Shah’s security forces. This startling development radicalized women 
through the 1970s and continued to the Revolution.98  
Consequently, gender dominated political cultural issues after the Revolution. The 
Iranian Revolution established temporary unity amongst its religious forces, gender, classes, and 
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various political organizations. Women’s goals were parallel to the objectives of men, as both 
rallied for anti-Shah, nationalist, and anti-imperialist platforms. While the unity of women 
emerged as strong at the start of the Revolution, their solidarity declined with the fall of the 
Pahlavi regime.  Women’s rights were subsequently subject to the Islamic Republic and the 
Islamization program of the Ayatollah Khomeini.99  
 
3.3 The Islamic Republic and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamization Policy  
The Revolution in 1979 ushered in the need for a new form of government. Such a need 
brought conflict between the conservative Ayatollah Khomeini and other liberal and radical anti-
Shah forces. Khomeini envisioned a conservative government, which would run in accordance 
with sharia law, his Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan sought civil liberties and democratic rule. 
Consequently, a government was established, which included a freely elected provisional 
government and an appointed council of conservative clerics. 100 
In the spring of 1979, the country held a referendum on the creation of an Islamic 
Republic. The result was a landslide in favor of the Islamic Republic. Later that year, an 
assembly was elected to draft the constitution. The majority of seats were won by close followers 
of Khomeini.101 The new constitution was a hybrid, composed of the democratic ideals of 
Bazargan and the Islamic government of Khomeini, called Wilayat el Faqih (rule by the faqihs or 
religious scholars).102 By the fall of 1979, a new development changed the course of regime-
building.103 Unfortunately, these changes often impacted women for the worse as the 
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Islamization of women emerged. The U.S. allowed the Shah into the country for medical 
treatment in October. The Khomeini forces interpreted this event as a sign that the U.S. was 
intervening against Iran.104 Student radicals believed the Shah’s presence in the U.S. to be 
evidence of a coup and took the initiative to occupy the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November.  
This was the start of the Iranian Hostage Crisis. 
Khomeini hailed the take-over as a second revolution and praised the student’s actions. 
The crisis reignited the revolutionary fervor of the previous year and discredited Khomeini’s 
moderate rivals as supporters of the U.S.  The crisis lasted for 444 days and left a deep 
impression that the U.S. was interfering with Iranian affairs.105 A year later, in September 1980, 
Iraq invaded Iran. The conflict would last eight years. Revolution had given way to repression 
and war.  Although at the vanguard of the revolution, women’s legal protections after the heady 
days of change and revolution were changed for the worse.  
 
3.4 The Islamization of Women 
Although upholding women as symbols of Shi’ite Islamic values, the Islamic Republic 
was particularly detrimental to the legal status of women. However, the Islamic Republic’s 
position on gender issues is far from black and white. Initially, the new regime inseparably 
connected women’s rights with conservative adherence to Islam. Consequently, mandatory 
veiling and enforcement of sharia law became effective. Moreover, the image of Iranian women 
as veiled and Islamic became an important symbol of success of the Revolution.106    
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Women became symbols of the legitimacy and success of the Revolution for three 
reasons. Scholar Hamideh Sedghi explores these in Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, 
Unveiling, and Reveiling. First, the veiling of women showed commitment to Islamic morality 
and Shi’ia heritage. Sedghi notes that veiled women were “bearers of cultural purity and 
authenticity.” 107 Secondly, veiling articulated an anti-Western political stance. Finally, the 
veiling of women relayed the “purification” of society and rejection of the Western values as a 
whole. Furthermore, this “gender reconstruction accompanied consolidation of state power, 
state-building, and the creation of new institutions.”108 
The Islamization of women under Khomeini’s Islamic Republic is especially prominent 
for the cohort of memoirists I discuss in this chapter. Many of these individuals took part in the 
Revolution, with the belief that their fight would lead to greater opportunities for women under 
the new regime. Their frustration and disappointment with the events that followed, especially 
the Islamization of women in Iran, is apparent in their memoirs. I investigate these expressions 
of experiences in the remaining sections below.         
 
3.5 Iran Awakening  
Shirin Ebadi was born on 21 June, 1947, to an upper-class Iranian family and was raised 
in a large, servant-lead household in the capital of Tehran.109 She recalls of her childhood that 
her family broke cultural standards, by not providing their male children with an exalted status 
over the girls in the family. Her education was prioritized, and she entered law school in the year 
of 1965. In this environment, Ebadi is surprised at the unusual concern many students have with 
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Iranian politics. She learns of socio-economic issues, along with the abuses of SAVAK that were 
tied to the Pahlavi regime. At Tehran University, she describes the environment of mixed 
genders and political activism to be horrid in the eyes of the clergy. However, her account 
illustrates the efforts at modernization the Shah had made throughout the 1960s.110 
Ebadi became a judge in 1970, at the age of twenty-three, and began work at the Ministry 
of Justice. Her work was interrupted by the Iranian Revolution at the end of the decade. As with 
many female Iranians, Ebadi supported the Revolution initially, and participated as a 
revolutionary against the Shah’s regime. However, like other female Iranians, she did not realize 
that in doing so, she was supporting a cause that would eventually take away her freedom and 
rights. 111  
One of the first reforms enacted by Ayatollah Khomeini was the elimination of women 
from the judicial system. As a result, Ebadi was rejected from her work and spent many years in 
the 1980s under pressure from the Islamic Republic.112 In the 1990s, the Islamic Republic 
reasoned that they needed women to return to the labor force, and Ebadi was able to return as a 
civil rights attorney. Ebadi litigated an extensive number of human rights cases, pro bono, and 
became a prominent human rights activist in Iran.113 Of great significance, Ebadi was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 and was the first Muslim to receive this recognition. Her award 
led to persecution from the Islamic Republic. This was the catalyst for her exile in 2009.114 
Iran Awakening by Shirin Ebadi is her first memoir, published in 2006. The scope of the 
text covers events from her birth in 1947 to her Nobel Prize win in 2003. It is divided into twelve 
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chapters, which correspond to significant political changes in Iran’s tumultuous history. The 
style of the memoir is personal, yet clearly politically oriented, as her writing presents her life in 
the context of professional and public struggles against conservative authorities. Apart from the 
reflections in the first two chapters, Ebadi does not give much attention to the relationships with 
her family. She does, however, assign weight to the influence of her husband, children, and 
friends, including countless anecdotes of the ways in which they are affected by the Islamic 
Republic. 
One of the most pertinent aspects of Ebadi’s memoir is her personal experience with the 
political changes that occurred during her life in Iran. She had great enthusiasm for the Iranian 
Revolution and participated as a revolutionary against the Pahlavi regime. Ebadi provides vivid 
and emotional memories, in which she expressed her distaste for the monarchy. She refers 
specifically to President Carter’s “Island of Stability” speech, the fire at Cinema Rex in 1978, 
and the articles published against the Ayatollah Khomeini, which caused the initial 
demonstrations of the Revolution.115  
Ebadi provides several insights into the mind of the revolutionaries, which help us 
understand the divide between the hopes of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. For 
instance, she writes of her thought process in supporting the Ayatollah Khomeini at the start of 
the Revolution.  
I found myself drawn to the opposition voices that hailed Ayatollah Khomeini as 
their leader. It seemed in no way a contradiction for me - an educated, professional 
woman - to back an opposition that cloaked its fight against real-life grievances under the 
mantle of religion… Who did I have more in common with, in the end; an opposition led 
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by mullahs who spoke in tones familiar to ordinary Iranians or the gilded court of the 
Shah, whose officials cavorted with American starlets at parties soaked in expensive 
French champagne?116  
She expresses her frustration and disappointment with the outcomes of the Revolution, upon 
realizing that she had “enthusiastically participated in my own demise.”117  Indeed, Ebadi was 
stripped of her judgeship in 1980, shortly after Khomeini took power and eliminated women 
from the judiciary.  
She writes of her dismissal, when she was advised by a handful of male judges over 
whom she had presided in the past. She could return to the legal office as a judiciary clerk after 
her maternity leave ended. She was six months pregnant at the time, and the male judges 
remarked at her audacity to take a vacation, in the form of maternity leave. Further, they 
discussed their complaints against women in the judiciary system in front of Ebadi. She recalls 
walking out of the meeting and experiencing a subsequent blackout, after which she recalls being 
at her home, traumatized from the event. The irony of Ebadi fighting in the Revolution for rights, 
which she then lost, represents the authoritarian power wielded by the state over the status of 
women during this time. Her experience runs parallel to other memoirists, which I discuss in the 
following sections.  
 
3.6 Reading Lolita in Tehran 
Azar Nafisi was born on 1 December 1948 in Tehran, to an upper-class Iranian family. 
Her father became the youngest mayor of Tehran in the years 1961 to 1963, and her mother 
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became one of the first women elected to parliament in 1963.118 Growing up, she had a 
tumultuous relationship with her mother and a loving one with her father. At the age of thirteen, 
she moved to Lancaster, England to finish her secondary education. She then received a degree 
in English and American Literature from the University of Oklahoma.119 Nafisi first married a 
man she did not love in 1965 but divorced shortly after and married her current husband in 1977. 
120  
During her time at university, Nafisi was politically active and joined an Iranian student 
organization to participate in protests against the Vietnam War and the Pahlavi regime.121 She 
slowly became homesick and returned to Iran in 1979, after the Revolution to teach English 
Literature at Tehran University. Nafisi remained at the university for sixteen years, grappling 
with persecution from the Islamic Republic, until her resignation in 1995.122    
Reading Lolita in Iran documents the ways in which the changes brought about by the 
Revolution affected her students and herself. She begins with a focus on a secret weekly 
gathering of students she held in her home to teach them Western literature. Their lives 
collectively become intertwined with the stories of the characters in the novels they read, as life 
in Iran brings new interpretations to their meanings. 123  
The text is divided into four sections, with a varying number of chapters for each. The 
first section centers on her secret literature group, the second describes her time as a professor at 
Tehran University, the third section chronicles her daily struggle with repression and interference 
from the government, and the fourth explores the political history of repression under the Islamic 
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Republic. She explains the reasons for her departure for exile. The style of the memoir is similar 
to Ebadi’s, as it is both deeply personal and deeply political. Nafisi also conveys a great love for 
her students, friends, and family. Her memoir serves as a tribute to their courage and resilience in 
the face of oppression.  
As with Ebadi, Nafisi connects much of her life to the Revolution and the changes it 
brought about. She tells her girls why she supported the Revolution and the greater opportunities 
and rights it promised.124 Further, she conveys her disappointment and frustration with the 
oppression and degradation of rights that she worked to bring about. In the 1990s, limited reform 
and relaxation of the regime took hold. Nafisi notes that the younger generation, which her girls 
belong to, does not remember the horrors of the Shah’s regime.  
Many revolutionaries and young Iranians began to reevaluate the West, as they became 
exhausted with the harsh political control and poor economic conditions. Specifically, Nafisi 
begins to blame the Islamic Republic as the root of all problems.125 She and her girls begin to 
discuss leaving Iran. Many, including Nafisi, conclude that there is no other option. As with 
Ebadi, the experiences of the Iranian Revolution, and the Islamization of life under Khomeini 
change her life fundamentally. Such a realization is similar for many female Iranian exiles, I 
explore additional examples in the section below.  
 
3.7 The Complete Persepolis  
Marjane Satrapi was born on 22 November 1969 to a middle-class Iranian family in 
Rasht, but spent her childhood in the capital city of Tehran. Her parents were politically active 
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and supporters of the Marxist causes against the regime.126 After the Revolution in 1979, they 
felt defeat and frustration as the Islamic fundamentalists took control. In her childhood, she was 
exposed to the brutalities of both the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Islamic Republic. She had family 
members and friends who were arrested, tortured, imprisoned, and even executed. Satrapi was 
particularly fond of her paternal uncle, Anoosh, who was a political prisoner of SAVAK and 
lived in exile for many years in the Soviet Union. 127 
 Satrapi grew up in the early days of the Islamic Republic and was an especially rebellious 
child. She took much issue in her youth with the oppression of Khomeini’s regime. She writes 
amusingly of instances of her childhood education when she mocked the daily rituals imposed by 
the government. In one of her classes, instead of participating in their daily mourning of the dead 
from the Iran-Iraq War, her dissident attitude leads to her suspension.128 For fear that her strong-
willed nature would lead to serious persecution from the regime, her parents sent her abroad to 
finish her studies in Vienna. Satrapi remained in Vienna for the entirety of her high school years 
and only returned to Iran to be with her family after graduation.129  
The Complete Persepolis by Marjane Satrapi encompasses her entire coming of age story, 
from the time of her childhood, starting in 1980 directly after the Revolution to her self-chosen 
exile in Paris in 1995. This famous memoir is presented in the format of a graphic narrative, 
illustrated as well as authored by Satrapi. It is divided into two sections, The Story of a 
Childhood and The Story of Return. The two sections were originally published as separate texts. 
The tone of the memoir is a juxtaposition between the innocence of a child narrator and the 
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disturbing nature of her situation in both Iran and Austria. Nevertheless, Satrapi manages to 
inject humor and irony into the challenges of repression in Iran and loneliness in Austria.   
Spending much of her youth in Vienna had a significant impact on the life and 
perspective of Satrapi. As she moved from the oppressive and strict Islamic Republic to the open 
and individualistic Europe, she utilized the new-found freedom to push her rebellious nature to 
its limits. Satrapi becomes highly Westernized in her encounters, participating in partying, taking 
drugs, and dating. There are times when her Iranian heritage seemingly ceased to exist. She does, 
however, maintain her heritage underneath, even admitting of the extreme guilt she felt at her 
behavior. She felt she’d betrayed her family, who sent her away to enjoy safety from the war as 
well as have freedom to be herself.130 
One of the most interesting features of Satrapi’s text is her juxtaposition of public life and 
private life under Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. Her parents were leftist opponents of the Shah’s 
regime and diverged from Khomeini and his Islamist movement. Their hopes and desires for the 
Revolution revolved around increased freedom and rights. Satrapi saw this in their private lives. 
For instance, she recalls many a time when her parents attended secret parties involving alcohol, 
music, and dancing.131 In these instances, they created a private space for the freedom they once 
sought to have throughout Iranian society.  
She juxtaposes this inner freedom with the outer oppression of the Islamic Republic. One 
time when they are pulled over by patrol officers on suspicion of drinking, the officers followed 
them to their home to search for contraband. Satrapi and her grandmother managed to enter and 
pour away all of their wine before the officers gained access.132 This juxtaposition represents the 
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hopes of the Revolution being eliminated by the reality of the Islamic Republic. As with Ebadi 
and Nafisi, Satrapi experienced serious life changes from the Revolution and the Islamic 
Republic. My final memoirist shares these experiences as well. I discuss her case in the 
following section.   
 
3.8 Journey from the Land of No  
Roya Hakakian was born in 1966 in Tehran to a middle- upper-class Jewish Persian 
family. She was a teenager during the Iranian Revolution and due to anti-Semitism, socio-
economic issues, and the ongoing war with Iraq, immigrated to the U.S. with her family as 
political refugees. Her parents were intellectuals, her father was a writer and poet. Her and her 
brother’s education was prioritized. Hakakian recalls ever as a child being read material that was 
critical of the Shah’s regime. She was told by her father not to share this information outside of 
their home. 133 
Journey from the Land of No is her memoir published in 2004. The text covers the years 
1977 to 1985, encompassing her teenage life at the start of the Iranian Revolution to her 
immigration to the U.S. at the height of the Iran-Iraq War. It is chronological and evokes 
optimism and beauty in the face of tragedy and oppression.  Hakakian spends much of the text 
focused on her family, to whom she gives much credit for opposing the Islamic Regime’s efforts 
to diminish intellectual thought and the autonomy of women.134 She begins her recollections of 
1977 Tehran, with her feelings of anxiety from an unknown source. She later comes to realize 
this dread marked the start of the Iranian Revolution.  
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Similar to Nafisi, Hakakian discovers the power of literature and writing during the hard 
times of the early Islamic Republic. She observes that it is the power of language which guided 
her through the political upheavals of Iran to her life in the present-day U.S. Throughout her 
memoir, she writes of multiple instances where the power of words had the ability to change 
people. For example, she speaks of a time in her childhood where someone had marked an anti-
Semitic slur on the outside of her family home. Subsequently, the proliferation of such rhetoric 
following the Revolution caused her family to feel extremely unsafe in their own country.135  
Hakakian was a girl at the time of the Revolution and only came of age during 
consolidation of the Islamic Republic. She felt excitement and a sense of possibilities when the 
Revolution came. Before 1979, her three older brothers had gone into exile when they were 
threatened over anti-Shah rhetoric. Thus, she opposed the Pahlavi regime from a young age and 
welcomed the idea of a new government.  
Growing up in the atmosphere of a revolution, taught Hakakian, at least initially, that 
revolution was a path to freedom. She writes, “This was 1979, the year that showed us we could 
make our own destinies… Together as girls, we had found the courage we had been told was not 
in us.”136 Her perspective was shattered as the new regime took hold from 1980 onward. 
Hakakian, as with all women, was forced to cover herself in public. Each school day began with 
a frisking from the “Members of the Islamic Society,” and Jews began to be singled out as non-
Muslims and unclean.137 The text ends with her father burning her entire collection of writings 
and books, deeming them unsafe to keep, and then declaring that it is time for them to leave for 
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America.138 As literature was the very symbol of her life and hope, it is telling that the Islamic 
Republic at least indirectly destroyed her library and with it her dreams of revolution. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
In reviewing the memoirists of this chapter - Shirin Ebadi, Azar Nafisi, Marjane Satrapi, 
and Roya Hakakian - one can draw many comparisons about their experiences and ways of 
telling the story of these experiences during the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini’s Islamic 
Republic. These women, despite difference of class and family background, felt similar hopes 
and expectations from the Iranian Revolution, which were later destroyed by the hardline of the 
Islamic Republic.  
For example, the authors of Iran Awakening, and Reading Lolita in Tehran, both emerged 
from middle to upper-class families in Tehran. Both Ebadi and Nafisi were well-educated, 
intellectual, and held valued professional positions. At the same time, these women were also 
very different and had different experiences of revolution. Ebadi was a revolutionary who 
demonstrated in Tehran during the Revolution, while, Nafisi experienced the Revolution at a 
distance, participating in Iranian student groups in the U.S. Ebadi remained in Iran until the late 
2000s, when she was forced into exile against her will. While Nafisi had already left Iran in 
1995, of her own accord, out of frustration with the Islamic Republic.  
Other comparisons emerge from the memoirs The Complete Persepolis, and Journey 
from the Land of No. Both Satrapi and Hakakian were children during the Revolution and in the 
beginning of the Islamic Republic. Both women came from middle- to upper-class families in the 
capital city of Tehran that were opposed to the Shah. Not surprisingly, they greeted the 
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Revolution with high hopes. The Islamic Republic, however, was not the fulfillment of these 
hopes.   
Satrapi was sent abroad, and spent most of her youth in Europe, Hakakian remained in 
Iran. Satrapi maintained some sense of autonomy in her life decisions and returned to Iran after 
her time abroad. By contrast, Hakakian experience the change and was forced into exile with her 
family. Only later did Satrapi leave Iran again. Both women remained abroad, in the U.S. and 
France.  
  The women of the revolution embody numerous differences of class, background, and 
life experiences. Despite these differences, they share remarkable similarities in their expressions 
of experiences with the Revolution. The main similarity is the rollercoaster ride of revolution and 
regime-building, the hopeful opening up of possibilities during the Iranian Revolution and the 
disillusioning shutting down of these possibilities during the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah 
Khomeini.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
4 CHAPTER FOUR: WOMEN BETWEEN IRAN AND EXILE 
This chapter investigates a cohort of female Iranian exiles who spent much of their life 
living outside of Iran, in either France or the U.S. These women were born between the years of 
1940 and 1980, and returned to Iran, or visited for the first time, later in their adult lives. Each 
individual experienced what it is like to be Iranian during the time of the Islamic Republic in the 
context of the Iranian diaspora. I review the following memoirists: Azadeh Moaveni, Delphine 
Minoui, Sara Saedi, and Haleh Esfandiari.  
The women in this chapter experience the consequences of a mixed ethnic identity 
because of their lives in exile. Each of them struggles to reconcile their Iranian identity with their 
lives outside of Iran. Their experiences are distinctive to their class and background, however, 
despite these differences, the memoirists share remarkable similarities in their expressions of 
experience with being Iranian under the Islamic Republic. Further, their experiences are best 
understood in the context of the political tensions which accompanied Iran from 1989 to 2009. I 
discuss these issues in the following sections.  
 
4.1 Iran in the 1990s and 2000s 
The dilemma which plagued Iran in the 1990s was the future of the Islamic Republic 
following the death of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1989. Historian 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami observes that Iran has experienced a crisis of succession and political 
continuity since Prime Minister Mosadeq’s overthrow in 1953.139 The issue became critical with 
the establishment of the Islamic Republic following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. This was 
due to the nature of the Republic’s political structure as fashioned by the Ayatollah. In doing so, 
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Khomeini dealt with two burgeoning concerns – his own aspirations for the Islamic Republic’s 
political structure, and the intricate actuality of Iran’s sociopolitical issues which followed the 
Revolution.140 Although the regime’s stances on many sociopolitical issues were patriarchal, the 
decade included a few reforms, such as the Family Planning Program, that did impact Iranian 
women in a positive manner.  
Shortly after seizing power, the Ayatollah eliminated all independent political parties in 
1981, and eradicated any remaining parties by the mid-1980s. Since this time, Iran has operated 
as a unique state which functions apart from any official political party.141 Instead, the nation is 
directed and lead by a number of political factions which determine not only the direction of the 
state, but also the fate of the Iranian people. While Khomeini limited the power of these groups 
during his regime and lead with an interventionist approach, his absence allowed for the 
flourishment of Iranian independent factions.142 As Eteshami astutely observes, “in pre- and 
post-revolutionary Iran, control of the state machinery has enabled a particular class to control 
virtually all aspects of national life – economic, political, ideological, cultural, and social.” 143 It 
is thereby essential for scholars to dissect the political factions which dominated post-Khomeini 
Iran, to understand the experience of the Iranian people during this time period.  
Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, scholar Mehdi Moslem observes several 
characteristics which define factions in Iran. The most significant attribute being that they do not 
control the state in any official capacity, but rather, each faction contains individuals who hold 
varying degrees of power in different leadership roles. Perhaps of even greater importance, the 
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factions are not under the control of a single individual – with the exception of the moderate 
right faction which was led by President Rafsanjani in the early 1990s.144 Iranian women varied 
in their choice of factions. This decision for most women was shaped by religious beliefs, 
stances on human rights, and many others.  
Generally, the first period of post-Khomeini Iran can be defined by the presidency of 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, lasting from August 1989 to August 1997.145 Following the death of 
Khomeini, serious constitutional reforms took place because of his issuance of a “Council for the 
Revision of the Constitution,” on his deathbed. Notably, the changes included adjustments to the 
appointment of the Supreme Leader, the elimination of a Prime Minister post, and the 
establishment of a Supreme National Security Council.146 The changes thereby resulted in an 
increase of power for the presidency, and a decrease of power for the Supreme Leader.  
It was understood at the time of the Ayatollah’s death he would be succeeded by Ali 
Khamenei as the Supreme Leader. Khamenei position, however, proved to be starkly different 
from his predecessor. Despite being favored by majority of the political factions, his leadership 
in the 1990s proved to be far from “powerful and commanding.”147 The Supreme Leader failed 
to declare any substantial decrees for any sector of society. Given Khamenei’s passive 
leadership, President Rafsanjani thereby established the position of the Iranian state after 
Khomeini.148  
In August 1989, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani inherited a war-ravaged, isolated, and 
economically struggling Iran. Many felt that the fervor of Revolution was over and had not 
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delivered on much of what it promised. Further, many others were disappointed in the results of 
the Iran-Iraq war, as it had not brought the economic flourishment they had hoped for.149 
Historian Michael Axworthy notes in Revolutionary Iran, that the war cost Iran an estimated 
$200 billion. Further, the war significantly decreased the value of Iran’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Finally, the government controlling prices of consumer products during the War 
weakened the non-oil sector of the economy an estimated $120 billion in capital had been sent 
out of the country by 1988.150 
The state of affairs caused Rafsanjani to begin his presidency focused on the Iranian 
economy. He and his regime implemented a five-year plan which was to “moderate government 
economic supremacy and relax some of the heavy restrictions on the market.”151 While 
Rafsanjani succeeded with slight economic improvements, his accomplishments in other areas 
such as domestic and foreign policies, and civil rights fell short of his campaign promises.152 
These shortcomings thereby served as a catalyst for the reformist presidency of Mohammad 
Khatami in 1997.153 
The period of Rafsanjani’s presidency is known as the Second Islamic Republic. Scholars 
describe the period which began with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 as the Third 
Islamic Republic.154 This was largely due to the fact that the Khatami era ushered in systematic 
change and a shift in Iranian politics.  
As previously mentioned, Rafsanjani’s regime focused their attention on the 
improvement of Iran’s economy. In his first term, he achieved economic progress which can be 
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illustrated by statistics. Scholar Ghoncheh Tazmini observes in his monograph Khatami’s Iran: 
The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform, “Societal indicators proved promising: 
infant mortality was cut in half, and consumption of staples such as meat, sugar, and rice, 
increased dramatically.”155 However, despite such changes, Rafsanjani’s second term proved to 
be far less successful. This term saw little to no economic, social, or political change, because of 
factional politics and the limitations enforced by Iran’s governmental structure. These issues 
paved the way to Khatami’s election in 1997, as Iranians saw the need for serious reform.156  
Given the circumstances which surrounded Iranian politics in the 1990s, it can be argued 
that the political landscape extended as a continuity of the Iranian Revolution. Such is illustrated 
by the central demands which dominated the 1997 elections – “political freedom, the rule of law, 
individual rights, transparency in the behavior of governmental agencies, and the need for an 
active civil society.”157 Further, these issues were promoted by Iranian women, as was the case 
with the Revolution.158 Their participation inserted women into the center of Iranian politics in 
the 1990s.  
Khatami himself is an enigma of an Iranian leader. He serves as an amalgamation of the 
conservative clerics and reformist liberal thought. This can be attributed to his upbringing, as he 
was born to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khatami, a significant Iranian cleric. Later in life, Khatami 
studied in the city of Qom under the clerics Montazeri and Mottahari. Additionally, he studied 
Western thought such as philosophy and secular scholars such as Kant, Hegel, and Rousseau.159 
With this background, Khatami served as an embodiment of the Revolution due to his 
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commitment to greater political freedom, whilst also diverging from its aversion to Western 
ideology. However, his ability to appeal to the masses and polarized political factions, as well as 
Iranians need for systemic reform, secured his presidency in 1997.  
Although it was widely believed that the majles or council speaker, Ali-Akbar Nateq 
Nuri, was to win the 1997 election, Khatami, as the popular candidate won in a landslide victory 
in May of 1997. His landslide victory set a record for the number of eligible voters and received 
sixty-nine percent of vote. For perspective, Nuri received only 7 million votes to Khatami’s 29.7 
million.160 Despite his popularity and the unquestionable support he received in his candidacy, 
Khatami struggled to enact many of his reforms after his election. As explained by scholar 
Ghoncheh Tazmini, this struggle illustrated the contention between the elected and unelected 
bodies of power in Iran’s governmental structure. Labeled as, “the paradoxes of the power 
structure,” Tazmini explains that “because of the unequal distribution of power among the 
branches of government, the Iranian polity is riddled with inefficiencies, factionalism, and 
systemic paradoxes.”161  
Khatami’s presidency itself reinforced the dissension between the Iranian factions. His 
victory validated “the left, the modern right, Islamic intellectuals, and progressive clergymen.”162 
The remaining factions were labeled as guardianship defenders. The factional divide inside of the 
Iranian government widened to the point that Khatami’s policies became ineffective, superficial, 
and vexatious to Iranian people.163 Disillusionment and unrest followed. 
Iran’s conservative faction has historically yielded a great amount of power in the Islamic 
Republic, in spite of the lack of popular support. This is because these individuals have 
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successfully monopolized the top Islamic governmental entities, which are a part of the non-
elected sector. More specifically, the conservatives controlled the clergy inside of the 
government, as well as “law enforcement establishments, Revolutionary Guards, foundations (in 
particular, the Foundation of the Disinherited with its unmatched economic and financial 
resources), traditional merchants, and vigilante organizations,”164 outside of the government.  
These resources and connections allowed the conservatives to rally against Khatami’s 
reforms and slow progress through intimidation.165 For instance, conservatives reacted to the 
1997 election with backlash and violence aimed at the reformist newspaper Salaam. Further 
resistance came in the form of judicial charges against Khatami allies, which caused tension 
within the government, specifically the clerics. At this time, they called for changes in 
governmental structure and withdrawal of support for the Islamists surrounding Khatami.166 
Apart from the tensions between the conservatives and reformists during Khatami’s first 
term, Iran experienced an upsurge of reforms during this time. The 1997 election was followed 
by additional victories by the reformists in obtaining 75 percent of the vote in the local elections 
of 1999, 80 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 2000, and in 2001, Khatami won 
his second term with more than 80 percent of the vote.167 He subsequently used these victories to 
open up foreign relations and internal politics. A unique facet of his campaign was that his wife 
served as a symbol of visibility of women for the Iranian people. Her presence influenced 
women’s position in society, as well as their hopes for the future.  
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Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) wielded great influence during 
Khatami’s presidency. In a report published by the Library of Congress in 2012, MOIS emerged 
out of SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police dissolved after the Revolution.168 The organization was 
established in 1984, and Mohammad Reyshahri was elected as the first minister of the new 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Following the majles elections of 1992, Reyshahri became 
associated with a phenomenon known as the New Left. This favored egalitarian and 
redistributive social and economic policies, with a totalitarian ideological line - including harsh 
repression of dissent and a strong commitment to the supreme leader.169  
The 2000s election was an overwhelming victory for the reformists and serious pushback 
from the conservatives, as the Guardian Council took months to ratify the results, and attempted 
to manipulate the outcome, whenever possible. In particular, women’s participation was at an all-
time high and influenced the results greatly. The results of the 2000 elections reflected the two 
infusible principles that triumphed the 1979 Revolution - the principles of democracy verses 
religious authority. The conservatives responded to their loss in the majles with a crackdown and 
increased restrictions on freedom of the press. By August of 2001, the last reformist newspaper, 
called Bahar, had been shut down.170  
Notwithstanding the conservatives’ tactical interventions in the regime’s reform efforts, 
Khatami and the maijes accomplished several feats of victory during their time. Specifically, 
reformists saw success economically, socially, and internationally. For instance, the price of oil 
per barrel went from $10 in 1997 to $65 in 2003, and development programs for education, 
electrification, housing, rural constructions, and nuclear installations continued to expand.171 “By 
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2000, 94 percent of the population had access to medical facilities and safe water; 97 percent of 
those between six and twenty-nine were literate; the mortality rate was the best in the Middle 
East; and women formed 63 percent of university students, 54 percent of college enrollment, and 
45 percent of doctors. The governmental also put aside a portion of the oil revenues for 
emergencies.”172  
Khatami also launched a campaign to improve foreign relations, and paid state visits to 
Tokyo, Moscow, Madrid, Rome, and Paris. Britain restore full diplomatic relations, which had 
been shut down since 1979, and Khatami made progress with relations between Iran and the 
United States. 173 He resolved much of the rivalry which divided Iran and Saudi Arabia over the 
Persian Gulf. By attending the the summit of the Emir of Kuwait and Crown Prince Abdullah 
iben Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia, Khatami extended Iran’s support for Saudi Arabia, which later 
resulted in the latter’s rejection of allegations against Iran regarding the “the bombing of the US 
military housing at al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia in 1996.”174 Ultimately, these strides reflect the 
systemic changes which occurred during Khatami’s period of reform.  
Internally speaking, the majles passed over 100 reform bills. These included the 
exclusion of all forms of torture and physical coersion - including sleep deprivation, 
blindfolding, and solitary confinement - the right of political prisoners to have legal counsel, 
access to family, and a trial by a judge with at least ten years’ experience; the establishment of a 
special press court to handle issues of censorship and libel; the right of all accused to jury trials 
with strict separation between judges and prosecutors; and the presidential authority to remove 
activist judges who blatantly interfere in politics and over extend their judicial powers. They also 
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attempted to remove the Guardian Council’s authority to oversee elections, and to vet candidates 
to the interior ministry.175  
Khatami’s progress with foreign relations and the reformists’ majority abruptly ended in 
2002, as George W. Bush identified Iran as a “sponsor of terrorism” in his “Axis of Evil” speech. 
He called for an “international condemnation of the Iranian leadership.”176 The speech grouped 
Iranians in line with Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, which came as a shock to Iranians who 
had been working with the U.S. to eradicate the latter’s influence in Afghanistan. It became more 
difficult for Khatami to push for his democratic ideals, and many Iranians spoke of the need for a 
militant campaign or a referendum.177 Ghoncheh Tazmini accurately discusses the consequences 
in Khatami’s Iran, noting that the move changed “the domestic debate in Iran, radicalizing 
borderline ‘conservative-moderates’ who had not completely dismissed the possibility of a 
dialogue with the US government.”178 Consequently, the infighting with the reformist party and 
the attack from the U.S. provided the conservatives space to insert their agenda. 
Conservatives thereby utilized this space to win a series of elections with municipal 
councils in 2006, the majles in 2004, and the presidency in 2005. Consequently, the country fell 
into the hands of “conservative hardliners,” despite their lack of popular support.179 The central 
reason for the victory was the absence of women, college students, and other members of the 
middle class who chose not to participate. The percentage of voters for the majles in 2004 was 
one of the lowest recorded percentiles since the 1979 Revolution.180 Mahmud Ahmadinejad won 
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the presidential elections in 2005 and ran on a campaign with promises to increase national 
security and fulfill populist promises from the Khomeini era. His election was definitive proof 
that the conservatives were successful in their objectives to discourage the reformers from 
political participation.181 
 
4.2 Women and the Age of Reform 
Rafsanjani’s regime, in the 1990s, perpetuated human rights abuses from the Khomeini 
era. Much of this can be traced to the issues with factionalism and influence of the conservatives. 
Despite these restrictions, his regime also aimed to bring a degree of cultural openness and 
relaxed regulations on personal life.182 Such changes led to the road to reform, with minor 
changes taking place during Rafsanjani’s presidency.  
The most significant change for women during this period was the government’s new 
family planning program in 1989. It encompassed comprehensive family planning and sex 
education for “brides and grooms before marriage, freely and widely advertised contraception, 
and an end of payments for children after the third. The program combined with other factors 
such as rapid urbanization and expanded girls’ education, to contribute to the rise in average 
marrying age and lowered the Iranian birth rate significantly.”183 
The push for democracy in the post-Khomeini era heavily emphasized the involvement of 
women. Their demands for equality steadily increased throughout the 1990s. Specifically, great 
strides were made with regards to women’s education, beginning with The First Economic, 
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Social, Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic (1989-93).184 The plan put forth a list 
of goals for women’s education which pushed for a higher level of participation in economic, 
social, and cultural affairs.185 These goals were furthered by second and third plans during 
Khatami’s era.  
Significant changes in the social norms regarding gender occurred throughout the post-
Khomeini era. Initially, Rafsanjani fostered an increase of women’s participation in schools, 
sports, and higher education by altering their legal statuses. 186  What followed in Khatami’s Iran 
is debatable. Such is the case because the progress attained during this period is primarily 
intangible. According to women activists, Khatami inspired confidence and traction for their 
platforms by bringing their issues to the table, however, little to no legal change took place.187 
Nevertheless, the years of the 1990s, and even the 2000s saw significant changes in women’s 
organizations. Under Khatami’s regime from 1997 to 2005, women’s organizations, including 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multiplied significantly. In the post-Khomeini years, 
women activists have joined the women in governmental positions to push reforms for 
women.188  
Perhaps the most significant change which occurred for women during this period was 
their ability to influence the election of Khatami himself. The election of 1997 marked a turning 
point in Iranian history because so many Iranians took part.189 Millions of the voters were 
participating for the first time because of the election’s emphasis on gender issues. Many 
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contend that Khatami’s victory was undoubtedly secured by the women’s vote.190 This argument 
is bolstered by the elections in 2004 as many reformists and even representatives were 
disqualified, causing a large portion of Iranian women to boycott their votes. Consequently, this 
led to the conservative presidential victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005.191 
 
4.3 The Iranian Green Movement  
The presidency of Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2009 is described as having brought basic 
human rights protections to a new low.192 The number of juvenile executions increased 
significantly and the persecution of women’s rights activists intensified, with large numbers 
being beaten, harassed, prosecuted, and imprisoned.193 The economy under Ahmadinejad also 
suffered significantly. Despite his campaign promises to improve the economy, unemployment 
increased during his second as well as his first term.194 
The elections of 2009, contrary to the 2005 elections, voter participation was exceedingly 
high. However, the results were disputed.195 Reformist supporters flooded the streets of Tehran 
in protest. It soon became apparent that the outrage was widespread, “from the privileged and 
secular to the university student populace”. The security forces responded with aggressive 
suppression. Protesters were arrested and imprisoned, and television broadcasts were even 
illegally altered to conceal the color green. The color Green had been the official campaign color 
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for Ahmadinejad’s main opposition candidate, Mir-Houssain Mousavi, and was revived as a 
historic symbol of Islamic freedom following the disputed elections.196 
Many scholars argue that the Green Movement (2009-10 CE) is distinctive from previous 
revolutionary movements as the purpose was not to completely overthrow the current regime, but 
to implement democratic reforms.197  The movement is connected to the 1979 Revolution 
because many feel it shapes the same ideology. Iranians, including women, in the Revolution 
fought against the Pahlavi dynasty for their democratic right to choose and exercise individual 
freedom. Some argue that once the monarchy was eliminated, these rights “were hijacked by 
radical clerics” after the Revolution.198 Similarly, the Green Movement fought for these same 
rights as Iranians rallied against the same individuals – the Islamic leaders and clergy who 
merely took the place of the monarchy.199 
The Green Movement protests expanded into a larger challenge against Ahmadinejad’s 
regime and Khameini’s leadership as the supreme leader. Scholar Victor H. Sundquist observes 
that the rapid growth of the movement, meant that it became more difficult to control as the 
intensity built within the unorganized masses.” 200 On 15 June 2009, over 200,000 Mousavi 
protesters occupied Azadi (Freedom) Square to peacefully protest the election results. The 
government responded with violent attacks on the demonstrators, which lasted for several weeks. 
By the end of June, there were over forty reported deaths, with twenty-seven taking place in the 
first four days.201 
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Demonstrations in Friday prayer, and ordered an immediate end to the opposition. 
Demonstrators remained vigilant, and over the two months that followed, authorities arrested 
over 4,000 people. Nevertheless, demonstrations continued for several months despite a 
crackdownon activists, intellectuals, and media. The Green Movement eventually turned into a 
political party, “The Green Path of Hope,” led by Mousavi. It exists as an ongoing aspect of the 
fitful democratization of the Islamic Republic.202 
 
4.4 Women in the Green Movement  
Women’s participation in the Iranian Green Movement was the culmination of their fight 
for women’s rights which started in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Their activism and 
participation in political movements has over 100 years of recorded history. Their participation 
in the Green Movement was not groundbreaking, but vision for women’s rights were 
revolutionary because they went beyond faction and party, ideology and religion, and violence 
and civility to affirm a gender-conscious program of change.203 For the first time in Iranian 
history, women from all backgrounds and beliefs, came together under the banner of increased 
women’s rights under the constitution and democratic law.204 The nature of the 2009 movement 
illustrates the evolution of the struggle for women’s rights since the 1906 Constitutional 
Revolution.  
Iranian women had already played a particularly influential role during the 2009 
presidential elections. They unified to form a coalition known as the Convergence of Women 
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and posed two demands. The new regime was to ratify the UN’s CEDAW (Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and it was to revise four articles of 
the Iranian constitution which discriminated against women.205 The coalition inserted itself into 
the media and utilized new technologies. Many candidates made women’s issues a central issue 
in their platforms.206  
Not surprisingly, women were very active in the post-election demonstrations. These 
individuals served as “political actors, journalists, lawyers, and activists,” and demonstrated the 
influence and evolution of Iranian women in post-Khomeini Iran. 207  They were so visible that 
sadly an Iranian woman became the face of the Green Revolution. Neda Agha-Saltan was a 27-
year-old philosophy student who happened to be in the vicinity of the demonstrations when she 
was fatally shot by a government-controlled militia.208 She became a worldwide symbol for the 
fight against tyranny and inspired many sub sequential demonstrations. The participation of 
women in the Green Movement illustrates the change which has occurred in Iranian society over 
the past century. Further, it inspires hope for the possibilities of Iran’s future.        
 
4.5 Lipstick Jihad 
Azadeh Moaveni was born in 1976 in Palo Alto, California to a middle-upper-class 
family of Iranian exiles. Growing up, she struggled with her identity as an American-Iranian, 
shifting between the conservative Islamic world of her home life and the Americanized liberal 
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community of her friends. Moaveni never felt completely herself in either respect and struggled 
with social anxiety throughout her adolescence.209  
Moaveni became a journalist, writer, and reporter. She received a Fulbright scholarship to 
the American University in Cairo in 1998. Moaveni was reporting in Cairo during the political 
upheavals in Iran during the year 1999. She traveled to Iran to cover the student riots at Tehran 
University and remained in the country for several years as a Middle East correspondent for 
Time Magazine. Notably, she was the first American journalist to obtain such access. 210  
Moaveni’s memoir, Lipstick Jihad, explores the complications of growing up in separate 
worlds, the Iranian exile community, the culture clashes of a new generation born to Iranian 
immigrants, and the Iranian reform movements of the 1990s and 2000s. The scope of the memoir 
extends from Moaveni’s childhood to her first departure from Iran in the early 2000s. Its focus is 
the internal struggle for belonging and identity in a hybrid of different cultures and influences.  
Moaveni engages with the tumultuous political upheavals of Iran from 1998 to 2001. She 
observed firsthand the injustices and human rights violations perpetrated by the Islamic Republic 
against the Iranian people. For instance, Moaveni observes a young man tied to a tree and 
whipped, in front of a crowd of 400, for owning and selling alcohol. She comments that Iran is 
full of violence, as every few months there are incidents in which drug smugglers hanged or 
women murdered for dressing immodest.211 Moaveni also witnesses the suppression of 
reformists, activists, and newspapers in the buildup to the 2001 presidential elections. In 
response, she became a participant in the women’s movement by voting for Khatami.212  
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A central theme of her memoir is Moaveni’s struggle for identity as an American-Iranian 
woman. She makes the crucial observation that these issues are intensified by the Islamic 
Republic, because of its influence over women’s behavior, appearance, and position in society. 
Further, Moaveni is viewed as an American and a foreigner in Iran, despite her ethnicity. 
Towards the end of her memoir, Moaveni becomes frustrated with the discrimination she faces in 
Iran, as it was intensified following the attacks on September 11th. As such, this became the 
catalyst for her to leave Iran for the United States in the early 2000s.213 Moaveni’s memoir 
represents the experience of being a woman in the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic and the 
struggle over the status of Iranian women at this time. Her struggle is shared by many other 
female Iranian exiles. I discuss some of these individuals in the section below.  
 
4.6 I’m Writing You from Tehran  
Delphine Minoui is an award-winning author and journalist, whose work focuses on Iran 
and the Middle East. Minoui was born in Paris in 1974 to a French mother and an Iranian 
father.214 Her memoir, I’m Writing You from Tehran, presents her return to Iran in 1998 after the 
death of her grandfather. At the age of twenty-two, Minoui planned to visit for a week to connect 
with her heritage and begin her career as a journalist. Her week-long vacation evolved into a ten-
year stay, during which she uncovers her own identity, a deep love for her homeland, and a 
connection between her late grandfather and herself, which she realized from re-living much of 
his concealed past. The memoir is written in the form of letters to her grandfather.  
Pieces of Minoui’s past are revealed at the start of her memoir, as she discusses her 
childhood visits to Iran to see her extended family. She observes that her last visit was in August 
                                                 
213 Moaveni, Lipstick Jihad, 230. 
214 Delphine Minoui, I’m Writing You From Tehran (New York: Editions de Seuil, 2019), 7. 
67 
1978, just prior to the Revolution. Notably, just after January 1979, her father attempted to purge 
all remnants of his Iranian heritage from his life, changing his name to conceal his ethnicity. 
Minoui remarks that in her Paris home Iran became a taboo subject.215   
As an adolescent, Minoui concludes that she is French, one-hundred percent, as she had 
nothing in her life to indicate otherwise. Throughout this time, she and her grandfather 
exchanged letters, although his visits to France diminished significantly. As a young adult, she 
gained consciousness of her ethnic origins, and in the 1990s, she began to experience subtle 
indications of the French public’s negative perception of the Islamic Republic. From this, her 
curiosity grew and culminated with her grandfather’s death, leading her to set out for Iran in 
1998.216 
In sharp contrast to her childhood memories, Minoui observes the impact of the 
Revolution and the Islamic Republic on Iran, as it is entirely different than the country she 
remembers. Her experiences in Iran juxtapose the differences of private versus public life. As 
public life is shaped by restrictions under the Islamic Republic, in private life much of the 
Iranian population participates in behaviors deemed to be immoral, such as partying, drinking, 
and gender mixing.217 Notably, their behaviors illustrate the evolution of Iranian society, what 
was once open has become hidden.  
Because the memoir is written in the form of letters to her grandfather, her voice is 
deeply personal in tone. As a journalist, Minoui experiences the harsh realities of the Islamic 
Republic, with her press badge being revoked and then reinstated on a regular basis. She is 
subject to interrogations and censorship. Many times, she finds her friends have been imprisoned 
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or untraceably disappeared.218 With persecution intensifying, she learns of her grandfather’s own 
persecution from SAVAK. Of which she writes, “like grandfather, like granddaughter.”219 
As with Moaveni, Minoui places a heavy emphasis on identity, and her own struggles 
with having a mixed Iranian-French ethnicity. She gains pieces of herself throughout the 
memoir, as she learns more of her Iranian culture and deepens her love for Iran. In the final part 
of the text, Minoui experiences the Iranian Green Movement, which then solidifies her identity 
as an Iranian woman. Her experience is reflective of several things - the oppression and brutality 
of the Islamic Regime, the evolution of the people of Iran, and the new status of Iranian women 
in their modern society.  
Minoui participates in the demonstrations in June, which followed the 2009 elections, and 
observes the range of Iranians who protested. Everyone was involved, from grandmothers in 
overalls, to teenagers in modern fashion. She describes the passion exuding from Iranians. 
Specifically, she describes the new position of women in the protests, as these individuals arrived 
without fear and many became a symbol for democracy and hope for the future.220 Much of the 
same is divulged in the remaining memoirs in this chapter. I discuss the parallel experiences in 
the following section.  
 
4.7 Americanized: Rebel Without a Green Card  
Sara Saedi was born in Tehran in 1980 to an upper-middle-class family. They immigrated 
to the U.S. in 1982 due to the ongoing Iran-Iraq War and the understanding that their children 
would not be afforded the same freedoms as they had prior to the Islamic Republic.221 
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Unfortunately, because of the ongoing war, Iranian borders were closed and they would have 
been forced to wait years if they had applied for green cards. Instead, they fled as political 
refugees and settled in California. The ensuing battle for their citizenship in the U.S. is the 
central topic of Saedi’s memoir, Americanized: Rebel Without a Green Card.222  
The scope of her text ranges from her birth in 1980 to her ceremony for American 
citizenship in 2005. Its tone is colloquial and comedic, with Saedi exuding her quick wit and 
humor in every paragraph. A central theme of the text is the importance of family. She 
continuously writes of the impact her family has on her life and identity, with several chapters of 
the text being devoted to her individual siblings and her parents. Much of her familial structure is 
influenced by her Iranian background and reflective of their culture. For instance, she writes of 
the close relationships she shared with her cousins, which came from the “true patriarch” of her 
family, Dayee Mehrdad. According to Saedi, “I grew up among nineteen first cousins, and they 
each played a pivotal role in my childhood and teen years.”223 
As with the other memorists in this chapter, Saedi struggled with the complexities of an 
American-Iranian identity. This is demonstrated in her problems as a teenager. Saedi expresses 
the crippling fear she experienced upon learning that she was an undocumented immigrant and 
risked being deported at any time.224 The fear kept her awake at night. It was balanced, however, 
by her other fears, such as being the only one of her friends without a high school prom date.225 
Saedi’s memoir ends with an epilogue in the form of a letter to herself, or the “Sara who 
never left Iran.”226 Here, she depicts the divergence between her Americanized self and the 
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Iranian identity she could have had. Towards the beginning of her adult life, Saedi comments on 
her loss of Iranian-ness in many forms, such as her inability to read or write Farsi and her instinct 
to eat rice with a fork. She juxtaposes the congratulatory comments from friends at her 
citizenship ceremony, which noted that she was finally one of them, with the disappointing 
remarks from her parents that she was becoming too much like one of them.227 She comments on 
the Iranian person that she had missed becoming in America, but concludes with the hopeful 
remark that they may meet someday and she will be able to take this identity on as her own.228 
My last memoir speaks to the complicated relationship between Iran and the United States in the 
following section.  
 
4.8 My Prison, My Home  
Haleh Esfandiari was born 3 March 1940 to an upper-class family in Iran, living there 
until 1980, when she, her husband, and her daughter immigrated to the U.S. because of the 
Revolution. Esfandiari met her husband, Shaul Bakhash, in Iran in the 1960s, as they both 
worked for the newspaper Kayhan.229 Prior to leaving Iran, Esfandiari worked as a journalist and 
taught at the College of Mass Communication in Tehran. She received her Ph.D. from the 
University of Vienna and pursued an academic career, following her move to the U.S. In the 
years between 1980 and 1994, Esfandiari taught courses on Persian language and literature at 
Princeton University. Notably, she was the founding director of the Middle East Program at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.230 
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In May 2007, Esfandiari was detained and held in solitary confinement at Evin Prison for 
105 days. Her memoir, My Prison, My Home is an account of this experience. The scope of the 
book encompasses her lengthy interrogation, arrest, and incarceration at the hands of the Iranian 
ministry of intelligence. Esfandiari also writes of her childhood in Iran during the 1940s, her 
career beginnings, involvement with the WOI during the Pahlavi era, the Revolution, the 
political tensions in Iran under the Islamic Republic, and the complex relationship between Iran 
and the U.S. She provides an explanation for why the Islamic Republic persecuted her in 2007 
and accused her of trying to ferment a pro-democracy revolution.231 
Esfandiari observes the brutality and oppression of Ahmadinejad’s Islamic Republic in 
detail as she recounts the rise of the intelligence ministry under his regime. Noting Ahmadinejad 
strengthened the hand of the radical hard-liners and maintained an ever-increasing paranoia of 
American intervention in Iranian affairs.232 In her account of the history between Iran and the 
U.S., she writes of the ways in which her country pivoted between repression and reform, largely 
because of American policy in the Middle East.233 
While in Evin Prison, Esfandiari experienced the severe brutalities of Ahmadinejad’s 
Islamic Republic. An incident of particular significance occurred when she was forced into 
recording an interview by her interrogators. The film would be doctored and broadcast to serve 
as propaganda for the regime.234 Indicative of the evolving Iranian people under Ahmadinejad’s 
regime, Esfandiari learned upon her release that large numbers of Iranians supported her and 
viewed her as a symbol for democracy. Notably, the Republic’s attempts at propaganda 
seemingly had the opposite effect, as media coverage of the Ukrainian and Georgian pro-
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democracy movements inspired many Iranians towards civic engagement in demonstrations and 
protests.235 The failed attempts by the Islamic Republic to control the Iranian people in the ways 
of Khomeini’s Republic illustrate the new identity these individuals held. As my analysis of the 
previous memoirs shows, this would become even more clear in the demonstrations in the 
Iranian Green Movement in 2009. 
 
4.9 Conclusion  
The memoirs in this chapter - Lipstick Jihad by Azadeh Moaveni. I’m Writing You from 
Tehran by Delphine Minoui, Americanized: Rebel Without a Green Card by Sara Saedi, and My 
Prison: My Home by Haleh Esfandiari - embody numerous similarities and differences in their 
expression of experience of being Iranian during the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic. All of the 
memoirists belong to the worldwide Iranian diaspora, a new phenomenon in the history of 
Iranian women. They all struggled with issues of identity, especially those who grew up in 
France or the U.S.   
For example, the expressions of experience in Lipstick Jihad and I’m Writing You from 
Tehran are nearly comparable as both women were raised outside of Iran, came from upper-
middle-class backgrounds, and returned to Iran after Khomeini died in 1989. Moaveni and 
Minoui were similarly persecuted by the Islamic Republic and left the country for exile 
thereafter. By contrast, these women were raised in different countries, with Moaveni in the U.S. 
and Minoui in France. Their families dealt with culture and identity in different ways. Moaveni 
grew up with an Iranian culture at home and struggled with her mixed identity of Iranian 
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American. Conversely, Minoui grew up in a household that rejected their Iranian identities, and 
so in her youth concluded that she was purely French.  
Further comparisons can be made considering Americanized: Rebel Without a Green 
Card by Sara Saedi. Saedi relates to Moaveni and Minoui in her identity struggles with being 
Iranian and American. She sought to hide her Iranian heritage at times, for shame over foreign 
impressions of Iran. At the same time, Saedi gains much of her identity through her experiences 
with Iranian culture. Unlike the other two memoirists, Saedi does not return to Iran in her adult 
life, but rather experiences the difficulties and consequences of being Iranian during the post-
Khomeini Islamic Republic in the context of ignorance and hostility in the U.S.  
My Prison: My Home by Haleh Esfandiari exhibits remarkable similarities to those of her 
counterparts in this chapter. She is, of course unlike, the other memoirists in this chapter in that 
she was born nearly thirty years earlier, left for exile as an adult, and experienced Iran, firsthand, 
prior to the Islamic Republic. She does, however, share with two of the other women in this 
chapter, the experience of persecution by the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic. Moreover, she 
experiences the suspicion that as an Iranian American, she is not really an Iranian but an agent of 
America.   
The women discussed in this chapter vary in background, class, and life events. Despite 
these differences, their memoirs convey significant similarities when it comes to the question of 
being Iranian during the time of the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic. The central continuity is 
that these women sought to explore their sense of identity, event to the extent of three of them 
visiting and working in Iran, and risking repression by the authorities. What is striking is that all 
these women found personal meaning in Iranian culture, despite a legacy of patriarchy, an 
74 
Iranian state given to authoritarian actions, and a wider world still not fully accepting of the 
people of Iranian heritage who live abroad.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed and contextualized the memoirs of twelve female Iranian exiles 
over a span of seven decades. These individuals are categorized by three distinctive time periods 
and other qualifications. I discuss women under the Shah and their experiences with the White 
Revolution, women from the Iranian Revolution to Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, and finally a 
cohort of women who grew up or at least lived for a long period, in the worldwide Iranian 
diaspora.  
These individuals exhibit distinctive backgrounds, classes, and life experiences, but still 
maintain remarkable similarities in their expressions of experience in their memoirs. So far, I 
have highlighted several commonalities and variations between the women of each cohort. 
Notably, the memoirists share threads of similarities and differences not only within their own 
cohorts, but also across the three cohorts. I present these findings in this concluding chapter.  
 
5.1 Iranian Politics and Life Experiences 
A defining feature for nearly every memoirist discussed in this thesis is the connection 
between their personal life experiences and Iranian politics. For instance, the memoirists from 
women under the Shah experienced significant life changes with the implementation of the 
White Revolution. In this, the protagonists illustrate the power of the Iranian government to 
define their status as Iranian women and the way that government has defined the possibilities of 
womanhood. Lili from The Good Daughter experienced these changes in her personal life with 
the FPL, Raclin’s sister Pari in Persian Girls experienced a similar change. Sattareh from 
Daughter of Persia was defined by the White Revolution as her entire livelihood in social work 
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was encouraged and funded by the Shah’s, and Pahlavi in An Enduring Love defined her life 
partially by the White Revolution as she was one of the central figures carrying out the reforms.  
Women of the Islamic Republic in Khomeini’s Iran shared the expression of connecting 
Iranian politics to their daily life. These women were influenced greatly by the shift from the 
Iranian Revolution to the Islamic Republic. Many of them define their lives by the oppression 
and difficulties of Khomeini’s Iran, which destroyed their idyllic dreams from the Revolution.  
For instance, in Iran Awakening, Shirin Ebadi experiences drastic changes in her personal 
life following the Revolution, as she was removed from her position as a judge and subsequently 
persecuted in her pursuit of human rights activism thereafter. Similarly, Azar Nafisi from 
Reading Lolita in Iran connects her personal life with that of Iranian politics, as she faces 
discrimination in Khomeini’s Islamic Republic for not complying with his Islamization of 
women. Marjane Satrapi presents a similar narrative, as many of her serious life events occurred 
because of the changes in Iran’s political experiences. Including her being sent to Vienna during 
the rise of Khomeini and her family being persecuted throughout her childhood for their 
reformist beliefs. Lastly, Roya Hakakian from Journey from the Land of No presents a similar 
argument as her coming of age was entirely dependent on the political changes simultaneously 
occurring with the Islamic Republic.      
Women between Iran and exile share this connection between Iranian politics and their 
personal lives as well. To start, Azadeh Moaveni in Lipstick Jihad is displaced and moved to 
exile after the dramatic regime changes during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Delphine Minoui 
describes similar experiences in her memoir I’m Writing You From Iran, as her identity and life 
is defined by the evolution of the Islamic Republic during the same time. Similar to Moaveni, her 
life is displaced by Iranian politics as she leaves for exile after the Green Movement in 2009.  
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Sara Saedi writes of a similar experience in a different situation in the memoir 
Americanized: Rebel Without a Green Card. She experiences the connection of Iranian politics 
with her social life as she struggles with immigration and identity issues stemming from her 
status as a political refugee. Consequently, she earned this status because of the dangers of the 
Iran-Iraq War. Lastly, Haleh Esfandiari, is personally persecuted and forcefully displaced by the 
Islamic Republic in 2007. She connects the timeline of her life’s interaction with Iranian politics 
to explain how this situation came about.  
 
5.2 Patriotism and Identity  
Another significant commonality shared by the memoirists in this thesis is a love for their 
country and Iranian identity despite their struggles with particular Iranian governments. Such 
features are illustrated in The Good Daughter, as Lili maintains her Iranian culture and roots 
after she fled for exile. She continuously reminds her daughter of their Iranian-ness and retorts 
her fear of losing their culture. This idea is also explored in Persian Girls by Nahid Rachlin as 
the author’s adult life is haunted by her Iranian past to the point of obsession. Sattareh Farman-
Farmaian exudes a similar quality in her text Daughter of Persia as she devotes her life to 
improving the conditions of her country. Finally, in this cohort, Farah Pahlavi continuously 
speaks of her patriotism and pride as an Iranian woman, and even writes her memoir to 
demonstrate this truth.  
 The quality of love for Iran and one’s Iranian identity is also shared among the 
memoirists in Khomeini’s Iran. Specifically, Shirin Ebadi demonstrates as much in Iran 
Awakening, as she refuses to leave her country, in spite of the persecution and violence which 
surrounds her. Azar Nafisi does the same in her memoir as she struggles to leave for exile 
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because of her connection with Iran. Marjane Satrapi in The Complete Persepolis highlights her 
Iranian roots and pays tribute to her country in the recounting of her personal life. Roya 
Hakakian illuminates her Iranian identity through evoking her childhood before the Revolution, 
in Journey from the Land of No, emphasizing the love she has for Iran.  
 Lastly, memoirists from my chapter, Women Between Iran and Exile, exude these 
qualities most clearly. For example, Azadeh Moaveni, Delphine Minoui, and Haleh Esfandiari 
maintain their presence in Iran in the face of persecution and oppression because of their pride 
and love for their country. Sara Saedi maintains these qualities through her Iranian identity as an 
Iranian American citizen, growing up in California.  
 
5.3 Shared Perspectives on Iranian Identity  
A final commonality shared by all memoirists in this thesis is their personal perspective on 
Iranian history. These narratives are marked with disappointment and frustration with Iranian’s 
tumultuous history in the twentieth century, even as they maintain hope for Iran’s possible 
future. For the memoirists in my second chapter, the turn of Iranian history with the Iranian 
Revolution left them exiled from their homeland, and a loss of a place they will never see again.  
For instance, Lili in The Good Daughter does not speak of returning to Iran, but her 
rhetoric and telling of her past reflects her longing for that which she left behind. Specifically, 
she is dissatisfied with the events which led to this change in her life. In Persian Girls, Rachlin 
expresses her disdain for the path Iran took with the Islamic Republic, as it led to the demise of 
her sister Pari. She writes of her disappointment at the changes made by Khomeini, such as her 
needing the permission of her husband to travel between Iran and the U.S., the mandatory hijab 
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she wears while in Iran, and the diminishing of human rights under Khomeini’s Islamic 
Republic.  
Sattareh in her memoir Daughter of Persia writes of the loss of progress made during her 
time in Iran, and the degradation of human rights which followed the Revolution. As it was her 
life’s mission to improve the conditions of the Iranian people, she struggles with the regression 
of the Islamic Republic. Lastly, Farah Pahlavi speaks of her disappointment with Iranian history 
more explicitly than the other memoirists. As one of the central figures of modern Iranian 
history, she writes of her devastation over the new position of the Islamic Republic. Further, she 
maintains that she has hope for its future, and will see Iran rise from its ashes. 
My second cohort of memoirists demonstrate similarities in their disappointment with 
Iranian history. Notably, they do not renounce the society itself, but rather the oppressive 
measures of the Islamic Republic. Specifically, Ebadi writes of the persecution she and many 
other Iranians faced under the Islamic Republic and follows such thoughts with her 
disappointment with the outcome of the Revolution. Similar sentiments are shared by Azar 
Nafisi, as she returned to Iran in 1979 with the hope of a new Iran that the Revolution would 
bring. Instead, she returned to be persecuted and oppressed by Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. Her 
reaction was one of dissent and alienation.  
Marjane Satrapi extends their feelings of the turn of Iranian history, as she recounts her 
country’s past and juxtaposes it with her status under the Islamic Republic. As with the others, 
she contends that Iran used to be a great nation, but under the Islamic Republic it has diminished 
into factionalism and persecution. Similarly, Roya Hakakian expresses her discontent with the 
turn of Iranian history with a discussion of its former glory days which she experienced as a 
child.  
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Lastly, my third cohort of writers share these sentiments as they are experiencing the Iran 
of today. Azadeh Moaveni, Delphine Minoui, and Haleh Esfandiari express their discontent with 
the superficiality and oppression of the Islamic Republic in the 1990s onward. As they 
experience the modern functioning of democratic elections, they maintain a degree of hope for 
Iran’s future. However, simultaneously, they experience rigged elections, and underground 
persecution from the regime. This creates feelings of discontent with the frustration of Iranian’s 
political history.  
 
5.4 Differences 
Given the remarkable similarities between the female Iranian exiles explored in this thesis, 
it might seem that there would be no stark differences in many areas. However, this is not the 
case. To start, there are generational gaps which separate the women. Some, such as Ebadi, were 
born into the simpler time of 1940s Iran. While others such as Saedi were born in the middle of 
the Iranian Revolution. While these differences do provide them with varying perspectives, they 
share what we may call an Iranian character, which is passed from generation to generation. 
Thus, we observe individuals such as Satrapi, who did not experience the Revolution as an adult 
revolutionary, but carry with her the burden of this event for what it meant to be an Iranian 
woman.  
 A significant contrast between the various memoirists is their different experiences of 
exile. For example, they left Iran for exile at different times in history. These different exits from 
Iran resulted in different circumstances, which in turn define their experience of exile. If we 
contrast the exile of Rachlin, with that of Ebadi, we observe that Rachlin experienced much 
prejudice from her host country because she was exiled in the U.S. during the Iranian hostage 
81 
crisis of 1980. Conversely, Ebadi left Iran in 2009 and did not experience similar hostility. 
Infact, she thrived in the Western environment as an academic, activist, and beloved public 
figure. These differences make the similarities between these women even more remarkable, as 
they represent something deeper about female Iranian exiles in general.     
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 As stated in my introduction, the memoirs by women have become a global phenomenon 
since the 1980s. The trend to write memoirs for a broad audience has become increasingly 
important for women to have a voice in their place in history. For Iranian women, this is even 
more significant, as they fight to negotiate their place in the public discourse of Iran. As these 
women present their stories through their memoirs, their remarkable similarities are apparent. 
Despite their differences in background and class, these female Iranian exiles share similar 
expressions of experiences in their lives in Iran and exile.  
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